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Abstract
The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) is an exceptional mechanism within the
framework of international human rights. The fact that it evaluates all UN member states’
human rights records on a universal basis sets it apart from other enforcement
mechanisms that do not give equal time to all countries or do not seek to cover all human
rights. Following the introduction of hybrid modalities in the third cycle, the UPR faces a
turning point in terms of who is included in the process and how. Drawing on semistructured interviews with UN officials, diplomatic mission members, civil society
representatives, and academics, as well as personal reflections on my experience
attending the 40th session of the UPR in Geneva, this project examines the participation
of states and civil society actors throughout the existence of the mechanism. In regard to
state participation, it finds that as states have learned “what to expect” out of the UPR
process, they have become increasingly adept at using the language of human rights to
make it appear as though they are engaged while maintaining ultimate control over their
fate in the outcome of their review. Conversely, while civil society actors possess
extremely limited agency within the formal UPR process, their strong engagement with
the mechanism through informed, specific recommendations demonstrates their potential
to exert “public pressure” on states if given the platform to do so. Given these findings, as
well as the solidification of the mechanism after fifteen years of existence, I argue that
visible civil society participation at the review stage is a risk worth taking.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
On the Floor of Salle XX: A Glimpse into UPR 40
For much of my time attending “interactive dialogue” sessions in Salle XX of the
Palais des Nations—three-and-a-half-hour meetings during which United Nations
member states peer review each other’s human rights records—I was seated a few rows
behind the delegate from the permanent mission of Burundi. While some permanent
missions attending the meetings in-person rotated which delegates they sent on a day-today basis, some, like Burundi, always sent the same person. When it was time for him to
make comments about other states’ human rights track records, he was almost
exclusively complimentary toward allied states, failing to provide substantive criticism of
their human rights records. Although this trend showed a generally poor level of
engagement with the mechanism, I was struck by the fact that he continued to show up
every day, in person, and wait on the floor for hours until it was his turn to speak, rather
than simply providing a pre-recorded statement as many other state delegates did during
the session.
During the interactive dialogue for Venezuela, the Burundian delegate gave an
especially complimentary “recommendation” in which nothing was recommended
beyond that Venezuela “continue taking appropriate measures to strengthen the various
institutions in charge of protecting and promoting human rights.”2 A few minutes later,

2

Using Edward McMahon’s “action category” system of sorting UPR recommendations by specificity/the
type of action being requested from the SuR, this would be considered a Category 2 recommendation, i.e. a
“recommendation “emphasizing continuity in actions and/or policies” (McMahon, “The Universal Periodic
Review: A Work in Progress”, 14). Although Category 2 recommendations can be somewhat substantive
when focused on specific policies that are creating active change within the SuR, they are generally
considered to be among the weakest recommendations. Burundi’s Category 2 recommendation is
particularly weak in that it broadly encourages improvement of human rights institutions as a whole
without identifying a specific area/subject matter in need of improvement.
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he got up and, instead of leaving like he usually did after speaking, walked up to the front
of the room to talk to the Venezuelan delegation. The Venezuelans welcomed him,
smiling and talking like old friends. While the President of the Human Rights Council
was trying to call on Costa Rica to speak, the Venezuelan delegation was busy taking
pictures with the Burundian delegate.
While there might not be any way for the OHCHR (Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights) to prevent complimentary recommendations in a statedriven peer review forum, something about this scene rubbed me the wrong way. For
Venezuela to do this in the middle of getting their human rights record reviewed
demonstrated they had become far too comfortable with the process. In an overarching
sense, some might view this type of state behavior as a natural result of the shift away
from the “naming and shaming” practices (using the United Nations human rights
framework as a means of singling out human rights violators and discrediting them in
front of their peers) that had once been common in the Commission on Human Rights.
Since the Commission was scrapped in 2006, the United Nations has moved toward a
more non-confrontational, cooperative model of human rights enforcement, in which all
states are invited to engage in mutual improvement rather than finger-pointing.3
However, some might argue that this “softer” approach has negative consequences—
although Burundi and Venezuela are both showing up to the UPR (Universal Periodic
Review), they are failing to participate in a meaningful capacity.4

3

Elvira Dominguez-Redondo, “The Universal Periodic Review: Is there Life Beyond Naming and
Shaming in Human Rights Implementation?”, New Zealand Law Review .4 (2012), 705.
4
Hillary Charlesworth & Emma Larking, “Introduction: the regulatory power of the Universal Periodic
Review”, in Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism, edited by Hillary
Charlesworth & Emma Larking, Cambridge University Press (2014), 10-11.

6

What is the Universal Periodic Review?
The Universal Periodic Review is an intergovernmental peer review mechanism
in which all UN (United Nations) member states have their human rights records
evaluated. Every five years since 2008, each one of the United Nations’ 193 member
states has gone through the UPR process. Each state is required to prepare and submit a
self-report to the OHCHR, engage with other member states via an “interactive dialogue”
(a three-and-a-half-hour session in which the “SuR” (state under review) makes a
presentation and other member states are allowed to comment), and make commitments
to address the issues that their peers raised over the course of the next five years.
The fact that the UPR evaluates all UN member states’ human rights records on a
universal basis makes it an exceptional mechanism within the framework of international
human rights. Its universality differentiates it from its predecessor (the Commission on
Human Rights) and parallel international human rights mechanisms such as the treaty
bodies. Overall, the universal nature of the mechanism is designed to “ensure equal
treatment for every country.”5

Basis for Review
Throughout the UPR process, the standards that any SuR is held to are based on
five key components: the Charter of the United Nations, the UDHR (Universal
Declaration of Human Rights), international human rights instruments to which the SuR
is party, voluntary pledges and commitments made by states, and applicable international

5

United Nations General Assembly, General Assembly Resolution 60/251, UN Doc. A/RES/60/251,
(2006), para. 5(e).
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humanitarian law.6 The first two of these standards, the Charter and the UDHR, are
largely universal, in that almost all UN member states accept them.7 However, despite the
universal nature of the review, the UPR process does vary state-by-state based on the
international human rights instruments,8 voluntary pledges, and international law
applying to the state in question. This mixture of universal standards and country-bycountry standards is intended to “[allow] tailor-made country-specific evaluation without
detriment to consistency and universality of the human rights standards within the
review.”9

Stages of the UPR Process
When states and non-state actors engage it to its fullest capacity, the UPR process
is ongoing, with a substantial amount of work being put into pre-review preparation and
post-review follow-up/implementation. Throughout each five-year cycle, there are a
number of key events that happen before (pre-review preparation), during (the Working
Group and the plenary session), and after (implementation and follow-up) the review
portion of the UPR process.

6

OHCHR, Universal Periodic Review: A Practical Guide for Civil Society, (2014), 12.
Rhona K.M. Smith, “To See Themselves as Others See them”: The Five Permanent Members of the
Security Council and the Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review”, Human Rights Quarterly
35.1, (2013), 9.
8
In light of this, many UPR recommendations have revolved around encouraging states to ratify
international human rights instruments.
9
Dominguez-Redondo, “An Assessment of the First Sessions”, 726.
7
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Preparation
The preparation stage is defined by the OHCHR preparing the preliminary
documents that will be referenced during the review stage, as well as NGO (nongovernmental organization) lobbying efforts and meetings between states. Beginning
with the documentation, three preliminary documents are prepared for each SuR: a
“National Report” prepared by the SuR (a ≤20-page self-assessment report), a
“Compilation of UN Information” prepared by the OHCHR (a ≤10-page OHCHR report
on human rights conditions within the SuR based on information sourced from the treaty
bodies, special procedures, and other relevant United Nations documents), and
“Stakeholder Submissions” prepared by civil society (a ≤10-page compilation of

10

OHCHR, Universal Periodic Review: Tips for Engagement at Country Level for National Human Rights
Institutions and Civil Society, (2021), 5.
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submissions sourced from various organizations both within and outside of the SuR in
question).11
The preparation stage is also defined by extensive civil society lobbying efforts,
during which civil society representatives meet with state diplomats in Geneva in hopes
that the diplomats will bring up their issues of concern when they make recommendations
during upcoming state reviews. Civil society members rely on state diplomats during this
stage of the process because they are not allowed a public speaking role during the
review stage. All in all, it is up to state diplomats to choose what background information
to utilize when preparing their recommendations, whether that be the three preliminary
documents, information from civil society meetings, information from meetings with
fellow states, the media, or internal intelligence.12

The Universal Periodic Review: From the Working Group to the Plenary Session
The review stage of the UPR is centered around the “Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review” and the interactive dialogue sessions that are conducted
within it. The Working Group on the UPR meets on a triannual basis via two-week-long
sessions (held separately from plenary Council sessions). Over the course of each twoweek session, fourteen UN member states are reviewed, adding up to 42 state reviews
every year. During each Working Group session, each SuR undergoes a three-and-a-halfhour long “interactive dialogue”, during which the state delegation presents on human
rights issues within their country (70 minutes) and receives recommendations from other
states in attendance (140 minutes). Speaking time for recommending states varies by

11
12

OHCHR, A Practical Guide for Civil Society, 11.
Bertotti, “Separate or inseparable?”, 1145.
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review. Speaking time for interactive dialogues is officially three minutes for Council
members and two minutes for UN member states/observer states. However, full-length
slots for speaking time are a rare occurrence and only apply when a small number of
states seek to present recommendations to the SuR. Most interactive dialogues have
enough states seeking to present their recommendations that the OHCHR diverts to
dividing the speaking time evenly among recommending states, usually resulting in
around 50-60 seconds of speaking time per state.13 Finally, after a SuR’s interactive
dialogue is completed, the statements delivered by the SuR delegation and the
recommendations that other states put forth are compiled into the “Report of the Working
Group on the Universal Periodic Review.” A draft of the report is distributed a few days
after the interactive dialogue and is finally “adopted” by the Working Group.
Although SuRs may sometimes list initial responses to recommendations in the
Report of the Working Group itself, they are not required to respond to recommendations
until the next plenary session of the Human Rights Council. When a SuR responds, they
categorize all the recommendations that they received as either “Supported” or “Noted.”
In UPR terminology, “Noted” almost always means “rejected.” SuR responses are
compiled in a thematically organized “Matrix of Recommendations.” In addition, some
SuRs publish additional documents containing more in-depth explanations of their
decisions to accept or reject the recommendations that they were faced with. These
documents often include more explicit rejections of “Noted” recommendations and more
conditional acceptances of certain “Supported” recommendations, adding a wider variety
of hues to state responses than the black-and-white nature of the Matrix.

13

Charlesworth & Larking, “Introduction”, 5.
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Implementation & Follow-Up
Although the spotlight is often placed on the review stage, much of the “action” in
the UPR process takes place between review sessions, during which states implement
accepted recommendations and the OHCHR attempts to hold them to their commitments.
The question of how recommendations can be implemented on a domestic level is
extremely broad, but a number of consistent strategies meant to encourage successful
implementation are employed by the OHCHR. Since 2009, the OHCHR has maintained a
UPR Trust Fund (the “Voluntary Fund for financial and technical assistance in the
implementation of the universal periodic review”). The fund receives contributions from
UN member states, NGOs, and individuals. It awards need-based funding to states in
order to target specific thematic issues from accepted recommendations, as well as
overarching efforts to support NHRIs (National Human Rights Institutions) and public
awareness of human rights. Beyond the UPR Trust Fund, the OHCHR works year-round
to encourage implementation of accepted recommendations, working to hold states
accountable through communication with national legislatures and civil society.

Civil Society and the UPR
Civil society actors are also involved in the UPR process, but, as a whole, it is an
overwhelmingly state-controlled process.14 With no speaking role during the interactive
dialogue, they are only allowed to submit “stakeholder submission” reports to the
OHCHR, which are compiled into a ≤10-page summary report by the OHCHR and may

14

Lilliebjerg, “An NGO Perspective on Opportunities and Shortcomings”, 311.
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or may not be read by state delegations. In order to supplement these reports, many civil
society actors attempt to strategically lobby UN member states that they think will
support their agenda before a given UPR session, in hopes that the state in question will
relay their recommendations to the SuR during the interactive dialogue. However, using
states as a mouthpiece is a flawed system that speaks strongly to civil society’s lack of
agency within the UPR process. This low level of agency often goes unquestioned in
academic discourse surrounding the UPR, as many observers are afraid that empowering
civil society would repel states from the process.15 In spite of all this, the UN continues to
emphasize on the importance of civil society participation in legitimizing the UPR
process.
Following the introduction of hybrid modalities in the third cycle, the UPR faces a
turning point in terms of who is included in the process and how. This turning point
represents a prime opportunity for the OHCHR to reevaluate the role of civil society
within the UPR process going forward into the fourth and fifth cycles. Although this
approach diverges somewhat from the OHCHR's original vision of the UPR as a
cooperative, non-confrontational model of human rights enforcement, my research shows
that giving the UPR some “teeth”16 in the form of publicly visible civil society
participation is both a feasible and a desirable reform strategy. Now that the legitimacy of
the mechanism has solidified over fifteen years of existence, it is time to remove the
UPR’s training wheels and fully realize its potential as a platform to empower civil
society within the UN human rights system. Although a more cooperative model of

15
16

Interview #10; Interview #14.
Lilliebjerg, “An NGO Perspective on Opportunities and Shortcomings”, 311.
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human rights discourse does have its advantages,17 the current state of the UPR calls for
this to be balanced out with more direct confrontations initiated by non-state actors.18 In
order to achieve this balance, the UPR must reign back the overwhelming level of control
that states are given over the process and create a space for actors that will provide
honest, well-informed criticism of SuRs. Analyzing the internal dynamics of state and
civil society participation within the UPR, I assert that increased inclusion of civil society
voices would dramatically improve the mechanism’s ability to hold certain states
accountable for their human rights responsibilities, keeping the best aspects of the UPR’s
collaborative nature while addressing its shortcomings when dealing with non-compliant
states.

Research Background
Throughout my analysis of the UPR, much of my argumentation regarding state
and civil society participation is based on a series of semi-structured interviews with UN
officials, diplomatic mission members, civil society representatives, and academics
conducted from September 2021-April 2022. As additional background for my analysis
of state participation, I reflect on attending the 40th Session of the UPR in Geneva.
Analyzing civil society participation, I reflect on the UPR 40 Pre-session and provide a
first-hand look into civil society participation through The Advocates for Human Rights,
a Minneapolis-based NGO that regularly participates in the UPR via Stakeholder

17

Dominguez-Redondo, “Is there Life Beyond Naming and Shaming in Human Rights Implementation?”,
683.
18
While some states do their best to keep “mutual praise” in check with specific, critical recommendations,
they are often shut down by the state under review/allied states via points of order. This was a frequent
occurrence throughout UPR 40.
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Submissions and lobbying efforts.19 Beyond my interviewees and my personal
experiences, I draw on a diverse variety of secondary sources as a means of constructing
a nuanced perspective on the UPR, including academic discourse surrounding the
mechanism, United Nations archival material, media coverage, and informational
literature produced by civil society.

Outline
Following the introduction and the literature review, the main body of this thesis
is divided into four primary sections. Chapter 3 provides in-depth background on the
creation of the UPR mechanism and its modalities. The background that this chapter
provides serves as an explanation for many states’ aversion to “naming and shaming”
models of human rights enforcement, outlines the history of civil society exclusion within
the mechanism, and thoroughly orients the reader to the structure and modalities of the
UPR mechanism. Chapter 4 goes on to assess the history of state participation in the UPR
to date, highlighting positive and negative trends of state engagement with the
mechanism through a mix of first-hand accounts from UPR 40, interview data, and
academic literature. Chapter 5 mirrors this model with a focus on civil society, drawing
primarily on interview data, academic literature, and first-hand experience from my
involvement in UPR-adjacent civil society activities throughout Fall 2021-Spring 2022.
Finally, Chapter 6 uses the findings from the previous chapters to envision a model for a
civil society speaking role at the review stage of the UPR.

19

Although I maintained an internship with The Advocates for Human Rights during much of my research,
I functioned as an independent academic throughout, applying for UN accreditation on my own.
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Rationale
“...going forward, the fact that 3rd cycle reviews can hardly be
distinguished from 2nd cycle ones is arguably going to raise questions
regarding the effectiveness and the credibility of the UPR among
observers of the mechanism. A tendency to respond to this issue through
exclusively quantitative methods [...] can already be detected.”
—Sara Bertotti, ““Separate or inseparable?”20
By examining state and civil society participation over its first three cycles, I
bring the literature on the UPR’s internal dynamics up to date, as much of the most
important academic literature on civil society involvement was written around the first
UPR cycle.21 In spite of many UPR commentators’ focus on state attendance and
recommendation acceptance rates, I assert that in-depth examination of the UPR’s
internal dynamics from a variety of actors’ perspectives is essential to understanding the
current state of the mechanism. If the UPR is “shaped by those who participate in the
process”,22 far more attention needs to be paid to the conduct of these participants than
the current body of literature on the UPR provides. For this purpose, rather than
presenting a quantitative analysis based on thousands of recommendations or seeking to
piece together human rights outcomes of the UPR, I attempt to humanize a process that is
often unfriendly, obtuse, and bureaucratic to people outside of the UN system.

20

Sara Bertotti, “Separate or inseparable? How discourse interpreting law and politics as separable
categories shaped the formation of the UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review”, The
International Journal of Human Rights, 23:7, (2019), 1157.
21
Hillary Charlesworth & Emma Larking, Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and
Ritualism, Cambridge University Press (2014); Lilliebjerg, “An NGO Perspective on Opportunities and
Shortcomings.”
22
Charlesworth & Larking, “Introduction”, 8.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter provides an overview of UPR scholarship, with a specific focus on
works that, in line with my thesis, analyze the internal dynamics of state and civil society
participation within the mechanism. They are often broad analyses of the mechanism as a
whole23 rather than spotlight articles focused on specific states or international human
rights issues within the context of the UPR.24 The selected works explore a wide variety
of the overarching dynamics inherent to state and civil society engagement with the UPR,
such as the structure of the UPR mechanism, specificity of UPR recommendations, and
politicization within the UPR.
When the UPR was first being assessed by the academic community after its
launch in 2008, much of the initial literature adopted a broader scope than articles written
during later cycles. Although they are mostly concerned with state participation rather
than civil society participation, they provide valuable insight into state engagement trends
during the early stages of the process. One of the key authors who contributed to this
initial literature on the UPR’s internal dynamics was Elvira Dominguez-Redondo.
Dominguez-Redondo’s contextualization of the UPR within the context of the
Commission sets her contributions apart from other literature that portrays the newborn
UPR in a vacuum. Her 2008 article “The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human

23

Edward R. McMahon, “The Universal Periodic Review: A Work in Progress: An Evaluation of the First
Cycle of the New UPR Mechanism of the United Nations Human Rights Council”, Friedrich-EbertStiftung, (2012); Charlesworth & Larking, “Introduction.”; Valentina Carraro, “The United Nations treaty
bodies and Universal Periodic Review: Advancing Human Rights by Preventing Politicization?”, Human
Rights Quarterly 39.4, (2017).
24
While some articles of this nature do contain some valuable insights related to my research, and are cited
throughout my thesis (Duggan-Larkin, “Can an Intergovernmental Mechanism Increase the Protection of
Human Rights?”; Smith, “More of the Same or Something Different”; Smith, “To See Themselves as
Others See them”), I have excluded them from this chapter in order to focus my literature review on papers
whose primary topics directly parallel issues that are central to this thesis.
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Rights Council: An Assessment of the First Session” is a primary example of this,
assessing the initial configuration of the UPR process as of the first session in April 2008
(after which many changes took place). Overall, Dominguez-Redondo adopts a generally
positive view of the first UPR session, viewing the UPR as an improvement on the
Commission in many ways. She paints state engagement in the first session as mostly
positive, asserting that no state used the session as a platform to “challenge the
universality of human rights” as many had in the days of the Commission. For outside
actors such as academics and civil society, the mechanism’s public nature is a helpful
improvement on the closed-door policies perpetuated by the Commission. However, in
spite of its publicity, she harbors concerns about public engagement with the process and
ends her article by foreshadowing problems that the UPR continues to struggle with to
this day—
“While it remains early to assess this phenomenon, the severe lack of
reporting of the first session in various national media indicates a level of
apathy towards the process. At worst, this suggests that the process is
taken much more seriously in Geneva than at home; at best, it may seem
that it is relatively easy to suppress the process, despite being public, from
national consciousness.”25
The other key academic analysis of the first UPR session was Juliana
Vengoechea-Barrios’ “The Universal Periodic Review: A New Hope for International
Human Rights Law or a Reformulation of Errors Past?.” Vengoechea-Barrios’ paper in
particular offers valuable insight in the transition of the review process “from paper to

25

Elvira Dominguez-Redondo, “Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council: An
Assessment of the First Sessions”, Chinese Journal of International Law 7, no. 3, (2008), 734.
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practice.”26 She emphasizes the overarching goals of mutual support, cooperation, and
sharing of best practices that the UPR was intended to promote, and uses intimate,
firsthand accounts of first session interactive dialogues to examine how these goals were
or were not reached in the example states’ reviews. Her findings reveal a wider-ranging
levels of state engagement than Dominguez-Redondo’s article, including SuRs engaging
in constructive self-criticism (the UPR of Brazil), rosters of recommending states who
fail to provide meaningful criticisms of the SuR (the UPR of South Africa), and rosters of
critical recommending states who place a strong emphasis on SuR accountability as a
whole (the UPR of Poland).27 Overall, Vengoechea-Barrios remains optimistic and openminded throughout, defending the mechanism’s already-apparent politicization as “both
[an] asset and a drawback”, in that while political dynamics between states can cause
disputes unrelated to human rights to arise within the mechanism, they can also provide a
platform type of soft power peer pressure that leads to positive change in the domestic
human rights practices of states being reviewed.28
In addition to more exploratory articles written during the first cycle, it is also
important to acknowledge the highly critical angle that some commentators immediately
adopted toward UPR upon the beginning of its first cycle. One of the most critical voices
in the initial discussion surrounding the newborn UPR were NGOs that felt that they were
excluded from the process. A key example of this can be found in Marianne Lilliebjerg’s
2008 article “The Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council - An

26

Juliana Vengoechea-Barrios, “The Universal Periodic Review: A New Hope for International Human
Rights Law or a Reformulation of Errors Past?”, (Bogota: Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional,
2008), 101.
27
Vengoechea-Barrios, “The Universal Periodic Review”, 111-113.
28
Vengoechea-Barrios, “The Universal Periodic Review”, 115. This is an argument that authors such as
Carraro would expand on in their analysis of later cycles.
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NGO Perspective on Opportunities and Shortcomings.” Lilliebjerg, an Amnesty
International representative involved in UPR negotiations, joins Dominguez-Redondo &
Vengoechea-Barrios in offering an intimate view of early UPR proceedings, but uses this
perspective to fuel a much more critical argument about the UPR’s lack of meaningful
NGO involvement. While she acknowledges some positive aspects, Lilliebjerg is
frustrated that the pleas of organizations such as Amnesty for “a review mechanism with
human rights expertise at its centre, thorough analysis of each situation, a dedicated
follow up mechanism and a greater role for civil society” went unheeded, leaving the
UPR with “considerably less ‘teeth’ than NGOs had originally hoped for.”29 While she
declines to comment on its long-term effectiveness due to lack of perspective on the
newborn mechanism, she expresses an overall sentiment of concern that the mechanism’s
lack of civil society input may lead to unchecked mutual praise among state
participants.30
Moving on to the end of the first cycle, Edward McMahon and Marta Asherio’s
“A Step Ahead in Promoting Human Rights?”31 takes advantage of being able to look
back on four years of the mechanism’s existence with a cycle-spanning analysis of
regional recommendation trends. They proceed to assess these trends by introducing
McMahon’s “action category” system for sorting UPR recommendations. McMahon’s
system attempts to organize UPR recommendations into five action categories: (1)
minimal action, (2) continuing action, (3) considering action, (4) general action, and (5)
specific action. While these categories do not explicitly evaluate the “quality” of

29

Lilliebjerg, “An NGO Perspective on Opportunities and Shortcomings”, 311.
Lilliebjerg, “An NGO Perspective on Opportunities and Shortcomings”, 314.
31
Edward R. McMahon, and Marta Ascherio, “A Step Ahead in Promoting Human Rights? The Universal
Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council”, Global Governance 18, (2012).
30
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recommendations,32 they vary based on three primary factors: the specificity of the
recommendation, the type of action that the recommendation is requesting from the SuR,
and the firmness of the language employed within the recommendation. The system has
gone on to be widely adopted by UPR scholars and even UN-adjacent organizations such
as UPR Info.33 Although five categories may not be able to fully capture the scope of the
tens of thousands of recommendations given over the course of the UPR’s existence, it is
an extremely useful tool for discussing the specificity and actionability of any given
recommendation, one of the most important issues facing the UPR.
In their article, McMahon and Asherio use their data on state recommendation
trends (filtered by region and McMahon’s five-category system) to place state
participants in the UPR into two distinct camps. They argue that “state behavior within
the UPR can be explained largely by the extent to which states emphasize a universal
human rights approach to international relations, versus those embracing cultural
relativism”,34 the latter of which they view as a “problematic stance.”35 To justify their
argument, they measure each regional groups’ number of recommendations and
recommendation responses throughout the first session of the UPR. Throughout the
piece, they use their data to reveal patterns of “friendly state” dynamics that cause
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recommending states to give SuRs uncritical recommendations.36 In turn, these
recommendations allow SuRs to cultivate high recommendation acceptance percentages
in order to appear that they are constructively engaging in the UPR process.
Overall, while many articles on the UPR criticize weak recommendations,
McMahon and Asherio’s offers valuable insight into the prevalent issue of “friendly
state” dynamics that leads to weak recommendations being given in the first place. They
use the divide between states that embrace universal rights and those that defer to cultural
relativism to explore whether a universal approach to human rights is possible, in the
context of the UPR or in a larger sense. Overall, they conclude with a strong vision of
criticism as cooperation, placing stock in the UPR’s ability to break the universal rights
versus cultural relativism divide by fostering an “interactive, relevant, and sophisticated”
global dialogue on human rights.37
After his joint article with Asherio, McMahon published another important article
on the UPR38 that adopted a broader scope towards the first cycle as a whole, entitled
“The Universal Periodic Review: A Work in Progress.” Published shortly after the close
of the first cycle, “A Work in Progress” shares much of its scope and analytical strategies
with Dominguez-Redondo and Vengoechea-Barrios’ 2008 articles. However, McMahon
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was able to make more authoritative recommendations thanks to a more informed
perspective on the mechanism gained from years of observation as opposed to the single
review session that Dominguez-Redondo and Vengoechea-Barrios had to base their
initial articles on. Mixing recommendation data sets similar to those found in “A Step
Ahead”, and observational evidence and interviews with people involved in the
mechanism,39 McMahon emphasizes need for both heightened NGO engagement with the
process (“having a meaningful and substantive role in the preparation of the national
report, having a recognized role in the Geneva country review process, and engaging in
oversight of SuR state compliance with accepted recommendations”)40 and for
heightened state engagement strategies (action-oriented recommendations, mid-term
reporting)41 in contributing toward the overall goal of cementing the UPR as an
“important instrument in the mainstreaming of universal human rights norms into regular
state practice.”42
Later in 2012, Dominguez-Redondo would join McMahon in reflecting on the
first cycle of the UPR as a whole and follow up on her prior research with “The Universal
Periodic Review: Is There Life Beyond Naming and Shaming in Human Rights
Implementation.” Also benefiting from the ability to look back on the first cycle as a
whole, “Is There Life Beyond Naming and Shaming” presents a much more assertive,
authoritative assessment than Dominguez-Redondo’s previous foray into academic
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discourse on the UPR. Identifying the UPR as a “non-confrontational” human rights
enforcement mechanism, she assesses the value of this approach in relation to “naming
and shaming” approaches that defined past mechanisms such as the Commission. She
defends the UPR’s methodology against critics who view it as a “toothless” or overly
politicized43 mechanism, criticizing overarching trends of “legal fetishism” in
international human rights discourse. As a retort to this, she explores the potential for
cooperative human right enforcement strategies to change human rights norms through
sustained state engagement and move human rights enforcement from “a blame culture to
a learning culture”44 placing an emphasis on sharing best practices as initially outlined in
the Human Rights Council Institution Building Package.45 This is a prime example of
positive arguments applauding the UPR’s cooperative nature that many supportive actors
(including the OHCHR itself) continue to employ to this day.
The most extensive collection of academic literature solely focused on the UPR to
date is 2014’s Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism.
Edited by Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking, Rituals and Ritualism is a
compilation of articles topically centered around the first cycle of the UPR and
thematically centered around the titular concept of the UPR as a “ritual” of sorts. Rituals,
as defined by Charlesworth and Larking, are “ceremonies or formalities that, through
repetition, entrench the understandings and the power relationships that they embody.”46
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This fits both the UPR’s structure (its formal, ceremonial quality) and many supporters’
long-term goals for it (to gradually entrench an understanding of universal human rights
within the UN’s member states). Meanwhile, UPR “ritualism” (“a distinct concept from
rituals”) is characterized by “participation in the process of reports and meetings, but an
indifference to or even reluctance about increasing the protection of human rights.”47
After they lay the initial groundwork, Charlesworth and Larking turn the volume over to
various authors who approach the UPR from different angles in each of their chapters,
including the mechanism’s relationship with the media, the treaty bodies, and NGOs.48
Overall, Charlesworth, Larking, and the compilation’s various contributors view
the UPR as an enforcement mechanism with strong potential, while simultaneously
identifying the dangers of ritualism and stagnation that are inherent to repetitive,
bureaucratic mechanisms of this nature. Their compilation provides a unique
anthropological perspective on the UPR, further reinforcing the applicability of a
humanistic perspective towards the UPR as opposed to a data-based perspective. As Jane
Cowan states in her chapter, she (and most other Rituals and Ritualism contributors) are
less concerned with the question of “does it [the UPR] work?” and more concerned with
the questions of “what is it?” and what does it do?.”49 This emphasis on the mechanism’s
process and internal dynamics rather than its effectiveness (which other UPR literature
thoroughly interrogates) places Rituals and Ritualism in the same sphere of UPR
discourse that my thesis occupies.
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After the scholarly excitement around the first cycle of the UPR died down, the
second cycle (2011-2016) and third cycle (2017-2022) of the UPR were defined by
articles surrounding specific states and overarching human rights debates within the UPR
rather than articles looking at the UPR process in a broader sense. Although many articles
from the first cycle that approached the mechanism from a broad standpoint called for
follow-up assessments building on their work during and after the second cycle, few
scholars stepped up to the plate to attempt an analysis of this nature.
One of the handful of authors to break this trend was Valentina Carraro. In her
2017 article “The United Nations Treaty Bodies and the Universal Periodic Review:
Advancing Human Rights by Preventing Politicization”, Carraro interrogates the issue of
politicization in the UPR and the treaty bodies by questioning whether it should be
viewed as a problem. Although politicization can be defined in several ways depending
on the context, Carraro defines politicization within the Council and its various
mechanisms as “the pursuit of political objectives unrelated to human rights.” Overall,
based on the results of her study, Carraro suggests that politicization is an inherent and
even advantageous aspect of the UPR process because it increases the mechanism’s
capacity to create an environment in which peer pressure can be exerted to coerce states
into improving their human rights practices.50
In order to “measure [perceived] politicization,” Carraro focuses on the subjective
views of the actors involved, surveying a few dozen “principal actors” close to these
mechanisms.51 Carraro’s subjects from both the UPR and the treaty bodies were asked to
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rank how often three phenomena related to politicization took place within each
respective mechanism on a scale of “Never”/“Seldom”/“Often”/“Always.” The three
issues in question were “country bias” (bias taking place when “certain countries receive
differential treatment than others with a virtually comparable human rights
performance.”52) “issue bias” (bias taking place when “some human rights issues are [...]
given more attention than others are.”53) and cultural relativism-related conflicts
(“universal values” clashing with countries’ cultural, religious, or ideological values.54).
Overall, Carraro finds that the UPR displays a higher level of perceived
politicization in the UPR than in the treaty bodies across the board, particularly in the
categories of country bias and issue bias. However, although “politicization is universally
considered a negative phenomenon,” from a credibility standpoint, she observes from a
practical standpoint that in terms of producing “actual compliance with undertaken
commitments,” the UPR is perceived to be more effective than the treaty bodies. This can
be related to the dynamics of state-to-state human rights discourse versus the dynamics of
expert-to-state human rights discourse, an important debate regarding the structure of the
UPR dating back to the mechanism’s formation.55
Carraro’s most recent contribution to literature on the UPR, “Promoting
Compliance with Human Rights: The Performance of the United Nations’ Universal
Periodic Review and Treaty Bodies”, further explores the avenues that the UPR and the
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treaty bodies use to promote human rights compliance. Moving in a more theoretical
direction than her 2017 article, she frames both mechanisms within the three main
schools of human rights enforcement—the constructivist school, the managerial school,
and the enforcement school. In relation to the UPR, all three of these schools have a place
within the conversation surrounding the mechanism. Throughout its existence, the
OHCHR has highlighted the UPR’s potential to trigger learning among state delegations
and promote best practices for the promotion of human rights on a domestic level,
strongly speaking to the constructivist approach. Over time, much of the discourse
surrounding UPR has also become somewhat managerial, as civil society members,
academics, and state delegations concerned with human rights strategize how to draft and
present “practically feasible” recommendations that will lead to positive outcomes on the
ground in target SuRs. However, based on surveys sent out to diplomats involved with
both mechanisms, Carraro finds that constructivist points of focus such as best practices
and mutual learning were fairly insignificant outcomes of the mechanism from the
standpoint of her interviewees. Conversely, she finds the most important perceived
quality of the UPR to be its ability to generate pressure on states, a defining sentiment of
the enforcement school. Carraro also identifies that, in the context of the UPR, this
pressure can be exerted both by peers and by the broader public. This sentiment in
particular has been an important influence on my decision to advocate for an increased
civil society role in the process.56
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In spite of relatively low public awareness of the mechanism in most countries,57
the last fifteen years have produced a rich body of academic literature on the UPR.
However, this literature is not without its gaps. While a select few authors such as
Schokman & Lynch, Sweeny & Saito, and McMahon have written articles focused on
civil society participation dynamics within the UPR, it remains an underrepressented
subfield of UPR discourse, especially considering that all of the aforementioned articles
were published relatively early in the UPR’s existence. This also ties into the overarching
issue of the majority of academic discourse concerning the UPR (especially discourse
assessing the mechanism as a whole rather than through a narrow lens of a single state or
human rights issue) being written around the first cycle. Overall, I seek to correct these
trends by providing an in-depth, up-to-date civil society-focused analysis of the
mechanism that draws equally from existing academic literature and contemporary firsthand sources such as my interviewees and my personal involvement with the 40th cycle
of the UPR.
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Chapter 3: Background
The Formation of the UPR (2006-2008): Forging a New Path
When looking back on the formation of the UPR, it is important to note the
largely unprecedented, trailblazing nature of the mechanism within the context of the
United Nations.58 At the time of its formation, the UPR was regarded by many as not just
the “only substantial change” from the Commission to the Council59 and the “most
significant product” of the United Nations 60th anniversary reform process as a whole,60
but, in its focus on peer review and universal standards, a new type of human rights
mechanism markedly different from any previous UN approach to human rights
enforcement.61 Although the Commission and ECOSOC had briefly toyed with a periodic
human rights review applying to all member states in the 1960s-1970s,62 the UPR was
taken much more seriously from the beginning of its formation process than any
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mechanism preceding it. As stated by Mohammed Loulichki, the chief facilitator for the
UPR negotiation process—
“...the UPR is in fact a new mechanism that had to be created and ‘built
up’; [this was] an asset because the Facilitator was free to improvise and
innovate without being impeded by the weight of an existing
mechanism...”63
Given that the “end result could have been achieved in a wide variety of forms”,64
analysis of Commission’s fall from grace and the negotiation process between GA
Resolution 60/251 (the initial mandate for the UPR) and Council Resolution 5/1 (the
primary founding document of the Council and the UPR) is vital to understanding the
intentions behind the mechanism and the foundation that was laid for state and NGO
participation dynamics.

The Commission
During the formation of the UPR, the conversation around how the mechanism
should be constructed was largely driven by an overarching desire to distance the UPR
from the Commission’s “naming and shaming” methods of addressing human rights
violations.65 In spite of its many critics, the Commission undoubtedly had many
remarkable achievements over the years, including specific landmarks such as drafting
important international human rights documents66 and overarching progress in
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establishing human rights norms that continue to function as pillars of international
human rights discourse to this day.67 However, this did not change the fact that the
Commission had become extremely unpopular by 2005. Many Western democracies such
as the United States were infuriated by the fact that autocracies were allowed to hold
positions of power within the mechanism. Conversely, many states from the Like-Minded
Group of Developing Countries (LMDC)68 saw the Commission as “a neo-colonial tool
having little to do with real human rights concerns.”69
Throughout its existence, the Commission sought to “examine, monitor and
publicly report” on human rights situations specific to certain countries, as well as
broader overarching human rights issues.70 As opposed to its successor (the Council), the
Commission was mostly operated behind closed doors—however, this did not stop it
from building a reputation as a highly controversial mechanism. The Commission’s
country-specific inquiries often drew controversy in that they were “highly politicized”
having no consistent “universal” pattern and leading to certain countries being targeted
far more often than others with similar or worse human rights records.71 Although
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regional dynamics of this targeting varied, LMDC delegates were often the primary
opponents of this practice, as well as the overarching concept of “naming and shaming”
enforcement as a whole.72 In addition to rejecting double standards, many LMDC states
fought against naming and shaming practices in order to avoid real-life consequences of
country-specific inquiries such as economic sanctions and reduction in foreign aid.73 On
the other side of the aisle, while LMDC states sought to prevent the UPR from
“degenerat[ing] into an inquisition panel”,74 Western democracies had their own
grievances with the Commission. The poor human rights records of many Commission
members were a huge point of contention throughout the Commission’s existence. Many
Western democracies saw the inclusion of non-democracies as a detriment not only to the
Commission’s reputation but the UN’s reputation as a whole.75
Since the Commission had attracted controversy long before the early 2000s, the
fact that it took over fifty years for serious reform to take place can be attributed to two
primary factors: increased power and influence within the developing world, and the
reputation regardless of the Special Rapporteur’s findings (Vengoechea-Barrios, “A New Hope for
International Human Rights Law”, 104).
72
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spread of democracy worldwide.76 As previously mentioned, developing countries’
complaints about naming and shaming had been a cornerstone of criticism against the
Commission from the beginning of its existence but, with the rise of the BRICS (Brazil,
Russia, India, China, & South Africa) and other emerging economies in the decade
preceding the Council’s establishment, these countries were gaining political influence
that they had not possessed twenty-to-fifty years earlier. From the democratic side of the
critical conversation surrounding the Commission, the tide of democracy following the
Cold War “heighten[ed] expectations and pressures on the [Commission], which it
generally failed to meet.”77 However, despite overwhelming disapproval of the
Commission from all sides,78 internally-based reform was rendered all-but-impossible by
a 2003 Commission resolution stating that “[a]ny decision on working methods should be
adopted by consensus.”79 This necessitated a more “dramatic” overhaul,80 which Kofi
Annan would adopt as one of his final projects before the end of his term as SecretaryGeneral.

In Larger Freedom
In 2005, Kofi Annan penned “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All”, an open letter to the President of the UN General
Assembly. One of the many reforms Annan called for within this letter was for the
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Commission on Human Rights to be replaced by a Human Rights Council.81 While other
actors such as mainstream Western media had been running a “well-orchestrated
campaign” calling for the Commission’s dissolution since 2004, the campaign’s success
can be attributed to Annan’s endorsement as reflected in the report.82 In the passage
concerning the Commission, Annan acknowledges the mechanism’s achievements while
strongly criticizing its flaws and expressing concern for its impact on the UN’s
overarching institutional legitimacy—
“...the Commission’s capacity to perform its tasks has been increasingly
undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism. In particular,
States have sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen
human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticize
others. As a result, a credibility deficit has developed, which casts a
shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole.”83
Annan’s appeal was highly successful—around a year later on March 15th 2006,
the General Assembly overwhelmingly voted to abolish the Commission and adopt the
Council via GA Resolution 60/251.84 This resolution included a mandate for a “universal
periodic review” to be conducted, stated as follows:
“The General Assembly […] Decides that the Council shall, inter alia [...]
Undertake a universal periodic review, based on objective and reliable
information, of the fulfilment by each State of its human rights obligations
and commitments in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and
equal treatment with respect to all States; the review shall be a cooperative
81
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mechanism, based on an interactive dialogue, with the full involvement of
the country concerned and with consideration given to its capacitybuilding needs; such a mechanism shall complement and not duplicate the
work of treaty bodies; the Council shall develop the modalities and
necessary time allocation for the universal periodic review mechanism
within one year after the holding of its first session.”85
This paragraph-long mandate was extremely open-ended for the establishment of a
mechanism that would go on to define the Human Rights Council. The lack of
operational details86 caused the year-long negotiation period outlined in Resolution
60/251 to be defined by intense, “somewhat torturous”87 intergovernmental debate
around what a universal human rights review mechanism of this nature should look like
in practice.

UPR Negotiations: A Rigorous Process or a Light Process?
During UPR negotiations, Canada made an initial “concept proposal” before the
rest of the Working Group outlining what the UPR could potentially look like, which
went on to be one of the most influential documents that shaped the UPR’s structure and
procedure.88 Although it was written by one state, Canada’s concept proposal was unique
in that it outlined two different sides89 of the primary overarching debate within UPR
negotiations: whether to adopt a “rigorous process” or a “light process”—
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“...the UPR could be an extensive, rigorous undertaking with emphasis on
quantity and quality of information and assessment. At the other end of the
spectrum, it could be a light process with emphasis on an open and
frequent discussion among peers.”90
The proposal’s “rigorous” model, also called the “comprehensive approach”,
would have been much different from the UPR we know today. Drawing from other
international peer review mechanisms such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, the African Peer Review Mechanism, and the World
Trade Organization, the comprehensive approach called for extensive background
research conducted by experts and/or member states, including SuR country visits and
consultation of in-country stakeholders. This would culminate in a “formal open hearing”
including “comments from the expert panel, the [SuR], and other [s]tates.” The proposal
argues that the adoption of this model would result in “an extensive, objective, and
authoritative assessment a [SuR]’s human right’s performance”,91 while acknowledging
the fact that such a model would likely prove labor-intensive, costly, and risked
overlapping with the work of the treaty bodies.92
The “light” UPR model, also called the “interactive dialogue model”, is much
more in line with what the mechanism turned out to be. The interactive dialogue model
called for preparation of background information by the OHCHR accompanied by a selfreport by the SuR and additional submissions from other states and civil society
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organizations. This would culminate in “a three-hour session of interactive dialogue
where the [SuR] would make a presentation on the state of human rights within the
country [...] followed by comments and questions by other states and responses by the
[SuR]. The proposal argues that the advantages of the light process would be its
simplicity and its ability to incentivize states, “through peer advice and public opinion,
[...] to improve their human rights performance”, while acknowledging that it would not
result in the “authoritative [...] reports [and] findings” than a more rigorous process
would. In its overview of the concept proposal, FES comments that while “[t]he lighter
process may be easier to administer”, it “would raise fundamental questions about the
value added by the mechanism and whether such a process would allow for a genuine
review of the State’s obligations and commitments.”93
Besides providing an overview of the formation process behind the UPR as a
whole, it is also important to understand the role of states within the UPR negotiation
process. Since the final guidelines of the UPR were to be outlined in a Human Rights
Council resolution, the Council’s member states had ultimate control over the
resolution’s content in spite of any input that the OHCHR and/or civil society had to offer
throughout the process. Accordingly, states were the ones that got their way—thus, the
Institution Building Package set the tone for the “entirely state-driven”94 nature of the
UPR. While states’ exclusion of NGOs during UPR negotiations will be discussed at
length in Chapter 5, this section will cover states’ input on the publicity of the UPR
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mechanism (one of the defining features of the UPR and post-commission Human Rights
efforts at the UN as a whole).
The final product of the UPR negotiations made it very clear that the UPR would
be an extremely public process. All background documentation for every country review
was made available online via the OHCHR, as was the “Report of the Working Group”
and other outcome documentation. In addition, every interactive dialogue session would
be broadcast live from Geneva and preserved via a video archive on the UN Web TV
website. This last point in particular made the UPR a special kind of “public theater” of
human rights, standing in stark contrast to closed-door mechanisms such as the
Commission and treaty bodies. However, this was not always set to be the case—during
UPR negotiations, the African Group and the OIC voiced their “vehement opposition”
towards livestreaming the interactive dialogue segment.95 This stance sits in line with
overarching themes of LMDC states trying to eliminate elements of “shaming” present in
the Commission throughout UPR negotiations. However, in the end WEOG (Western
European and Other States Group) democracies were able to counter this movement, and
the push to make the UPR a publicly visible mechanism by livestreaming the interactive
dialogue prevailed.
Although the term “peer review” was used heavily to describe the process
throughout the negotiations and preliminary documentation leading up to Resolution
60/251,96 the General Assembly settled on the title of “Universal Periodic Review” in the
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final draft of the resolution in order to “[underline] that the UPR is not exclusively an
intergovernmental process but one based on reliable information from a variety of
sources.”97 However, considering that the Working Group went on to design a statecentric, primarily intergovernmental mechanism that largely excludes NGOs,98 “peer
review” arguably remains the more accurate label, as reflected in the title of this thesis.
Shortly after the passage of Resolution 60/251 in 2006, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung’s
A New Chapter for Human Rights asserted that whether or not to involve human rights
experts such as NGO representatives and independent human rights experts (academics,
lawyers) in the UPR process was “the most important decision” that was made during the
UPR’s formation process.99 In accordance with this, beyond overarching topics such as
the overall rigor of the process, civil society and expert involvement turned out to be the
most contentious topics of the formational debates. The debate was marked by a clear
divide between the majority of NGOs and experts advocating for their own inclusion100
and the majority of states advocating for a peer review mechanism partially or fully
excluding NGOs101 and experts102 from the process.
NGOs that participated in the UPR negotiation process such as Human Rights
Watch, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, and Amnesty International fought not only for civil
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society and expert participation in the UPR process, but specifically for NGOs to be able
to speak in the interactive dialogue.103 Arguments in favor of NGO inclusion were often
centered around the idea that civil society and expert involvement in the UPR would
improve the integrity of the mechanism and prevent politicization.104 Indeed, some
argued that the only way to put a stop to politicization in the Council as a whole would be
to “create a [Council] composed of experts.”105 However, this was not meant to be. In the
end, despite the opportunities for NGO involvement in the assembly of background
documentation and during the plenary session, the states opposing visible participation
for civil society and experts (LMDC states in particular) triumphed—when examining the
finished product, the lack of expert and NGO involvement is undoubtedly “one of the
distinctive features of the UPR” in relation to other human rights mechanisms.106 While
states were pleased with the prospect of state-driven interactive dialogue model, many
NGOs107 became discouraged as the more rigorous aspects of the mechanism were
stripped away over the course of the negotiation process—
“...the UN has little need for another toothless mechanism for “cooperative
dialogue.” We call on Council members to fashion a mechanism that will,
in a fair manner, apply real scrutiny, to hold governments to account and
cite them for violations and abuses.”108
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Standards for Review: Attempting Universality
The task of making the UPR truly “universal” in sharp contrast to the
Commission’s selectivity was a top priority throughout the UPR negotiation process.109
Analyzing GA Resolution 60/251 (particularly the line stating that the UPR process must
be undertaken “in a manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal treatment
with respect to all States”) Walter Kälin asserts that “it is hard to imagine stronger
language to express the notion that states’ human rights obligations are universal.”110
Although some questioned how consistent standards for review would be established in
light of the varying human rights commitments that member states have undertaken,111
the Working Group eventually settled on the mixture of universal standards and countryby-country standards that it continues to use to this day. However, some observers such
as Jane Cowan question this approach, arguing that “[the] assumed equality [of the UPR]
‘ignore[s] or downplay[s] the asymmetries existing [outside] of the review’” and that
consideration of “the power relations which are obscured in the UPR’s disconcerting
friendly phrases” is essential in analysis of the mechanism.112

The Final Outcome: Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1
On June 18th, 2007 the Council adopted Resolution 5/1, an “Institution Building
Package” outlining the structure and technical details of the Council and the UPR
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mechanism. Chief facilitator Mohammad Loulichki proudly noted the expanded scope
and ambition of the UPR mechanism as outlined in the Institution Building Package in
relation to GA Resolution 60/251’s original mandate.113 However, the final product was a
compromise that left many states and civil society actors with mixed feelings. NGOs who
participated in/observed the process were disappointed that more rigorous proposals were
left by the wayside during negotiations.114 This division between those who express the
UPR’s novelty and ambition in the scope of international human rights enforcement and
those who criticize its lack of rigor/enforcement capabilities persists to this day. As stated
by Edward McMahon:
...the UPR is a compromise, born out of the need to have a meaningful
instrument to promote universal human rights norms while respecting the
reality of a consensus-based decision-making process [...it is] a
compromise between states with greater and lesser commitments to human
rights protection, and between states with vastly differing perceptions of
what should be the role and function of the HRC [Human Rights Council]
and the UPR.115
Guided by the base principles for the mechanism as outlined in sections 3(a)-3(m) of
Resolution 5/1, the OHCHR proceeded into the first cycle of the Universal Periodic
Review—
The universal periodic review should:
(a) Promote the universality, interdependence, indivisibility and interrelatedness
of all human rights;
(b) Be a cooperative mechanism based on objective and reliable information and
on interactive dialogue;
(c) Ensure universal coverage and equal treatment of all States;
(d) Be an intergovernmental process, United Nations Member-driven and actionoriented;
(e) Fully involve the country under review;
(f) Complement and not duplicate other human rights mechanisms, thus
113
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representing an added value;
(g) Be conducted in an objective, transparent, non-selective, constructive, nonconfrontational and non-politicised manner;
(h) Not be overly burdensome to the concerned State or to the agenda of the
Council;
(i) Not be overly long; it should be realistic and not absorb a disproportionate
amount of time, human and financial resources;
(j) Not diminish the Council’s capacity to respond to urgent human rights
situations;
(k) Fully integrate a gender perspective;
(l) Without prejudice to the obligations contained in the elements provided for in
the basis of review, take into account the level of development and specificities of
countries;
(m) Ensure the participation of all relevant stakeholders, including nongovernmental organizations and national human rights institutions.116

The First Three Cycles of the UPR
As of January 2022, the UPR has finished three full cycles, meaning that all UN member
states have stood for three review sessions. Over the course of these three cycles,
numerous formal and informal changes have taken place. While I will be focusing more
on the informal changes in Chapters 4 & 5, the main differences between the UPR cycles
to date are as follows:

The First Cycle of the UPR (2008-2011)
In spite of the fact that many states and stakeholders initially found the UPR to be
“unfamiliar and confusing”, the first cycle was a period largely defined by excitement
over the new mechanism.117 Much of the academic literature that holistically assesses the
UPR as a mechanism comes from this period. The number of states seeking to give their
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peers recommendations increased drastically over this period, going from 430
recommendations given in the first session of the cycle to 2434 recommendations being
given in the final session of the cycle.118 The process also triggered a wave of
constructive engagement with UN human rights instruments for some countries.119

The Second Cycle of the UPR (2012-2016)
The second cycle is notable for being the only cycle to date that was subject to
explicit structural changes from the previous cycle based on Council resolutions 16/21
and 17/119, which came as part of a scheduled institutional review that was part of the
UPR’s original founding agreement. Other than minor technical changes, the main
outcome of these resolutions was a declaration of the OHCHR’s intention to emphasize
accountability for implementation of accepted recommendations going into the second
cycle and reform measures intended to put a stop to first cycle “jury-rigging” practices in
the recommending state sign-up system (Resolution 16/21; Resolution 17/119. The
second cycle is also notable for being the first time the UPR was able to follow up on
previously accepted recommendations. Overall, the fact that the UPR retained 100%
participation of all 193 UN member states (in stark contrast to the inconsistency of treaty
body submissions) throughout the second cycle cemented it as a mechanism capable of
motivating states to voluntarily participate in a periodic human rights review.
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The Third Cycle of the UPR (2017-2022)
Without any explicit structural changes, the third cycle of the UPR has proceeded
in a similar fashion to the second cycle, albeit with slightly increased participation from
the second cycle in terms of total number of recommendations.120 Over the course of this
cycle, the number of Stakeholder Submissions have notably increased121 as familiarity
with UPR procedures and deadlines has gradually increased among the NGO community.
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Chapter 4: State Participation in the UPR
Introduction to State Participation (2008-2022)
“The principal UN human rights organ is not a tribunal of impartial
judges, not an academy of specialists in human rights, nor a club of human
rights activists. It is a political organ composed of States represented by
governments that as such reflect the political forces of the world as it is.”
—Edward McMahon, “Evolution Not Revolution”122
Despite a number of specifications, expectations, and goals outlined in the
Institution Building Package, nobody knew what the UPR was really going to look like
until the first session began. At the close of the third cycle, the conduct of states has
become the primary determinant of the quality of the discourse within the mechanism.123
With this in mind, I use this chapter to focus on state participation in both a broad sense
and in terms of specific case studies. In my broad analysis, I showcase a diverse variety
of participatory issues that demonstrate the ways in which many states have failed to
engage with the UPR in a constructive manner over the last fifteen years. These issues
include blatant attempts by states to sabotage the process, lack of inter-state interactivity,
and performative/ritualistic state participation. Overall, my analysis of state participation
serves two purposes. First, it demonstrates that states have almost total control over the
UPR mechanism and its outcomes, serving as a direct contrast to the level of agency
afforded to civil society.124 Second, it asserts that state participation in the UPR is
generally low enough to warrant a serious reform of the mechanism, with many SuRs
adopting performative engagement styles and recommending states failing to serve as
honest, informed critics.
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Interactive Dialogue & The Art of Peer Pressure
As asserted by many of my interviewees, much of the action surrounding the UPR
happens outside of the review stage. With post-review implementation efforts becoming
the primary focus of the OHCHR throughout the second and third cycles, some see the
meetings in Salle XX as “a small part of the overall UPR process” and that the countrylevel work that takes place after the review is much more important than the review
itself.125 While this may be true for implementation, when it comes to avenues for
recommending states to influence the UPR process, the interactive dialogue is
undoubtedly the central component of the process for two reasons: its ability to exert soft
power through peer pressure and its public visibility.
As asserted by Carraro, “the UPR’s main perceived strength lies in generating
pressure on states.”126 This pressure comes from two main sources—the diplomatic ties
between states giving each other recommendations and the publicity of the mechanism.
Even though states only get about a minute to speak during most interactive dialogue
sessions, every UN member state, as well as observing members such as Palestine and the
Holy See, has the power to give direct recommendations to the SuR in a publicly visible
forum. The SuR then has to respond to every one of these recommendations.
Recommendations are not legally binding—even when the SuR agrees to them on paper,
if it chooses not to follow them in practice, the worst that can happen is them being
publicly shamed at the next UPR for not keeping their promises.127 However, depending
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on the SuR in question, the threat of being perceived by its international peers as noncompliant with its human rights obligations can be a strong deterrent.
In spite of this, some states are not easily swayed by concepts such as peer
pressure or public shame. Attempting to pressure certain types of countries into changing
their human rights practices by means of a peer review mechanism may prove ineffective
due to the country in question’s political standing. Major world powers such as China and
the United States hold much more economic, military, and political power than most
other states, which is evident in all of their international interactions despite the UPRs
intended equality. Deeply entrenched authoritarian states such as Venezuela, North
Korea, and Cuba have already been forced to survive under extreme international
pressure long before the establishment of the UPR (or, for that matter, contemporary
human rights discourse as a whole). In addition, the state giving the recommendation is
often a key factor in whether or not it is taken seriously by the SuR.128
Another reason that the mechanism may be ineffective at pressuring some states
into changing their human rights practices may be due to the fact that the UPR, in its
current form, does a poor job of exerting public pressure on states. Although public
pressure is a commonly discussed feature of the UPR,129 the mechanism’s theoretically
public nature can be deceiving. Open access to interactive dialogue recordings and
documentation does not necessarily equate to public awareness of the mechanism on the
ground. This problem is exacerbated by the media’s disinterest and/or open hostility
towards the mechanism. Furthermore, the lack of a platform for publicly visible civil
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society engagement at the review stage diminishes NGOs’ ability to generate interest in
the UPR among the public in their home countries.130
Overall, many states see the UPR as an opportunity to “look good” and to at least
“appear to be respecting human rights”131 in front of their international peers, whether or
not the general public is engaged with the mechanism. However, the more difficult
question facing the mechanism is whether this pressure can be translated into actual
compliance rather than performative engagement. Since the UPR is a state driven
process, to what degree pressure is strategically exerted (or left untapped) is largely up to
states themselves. With this in mind, it is essential to examine not just the avenues for
states to pressure their peers within the UPR framework, but how they use these avenues
in practice.

How States Use Their Power
Now that the potential for exertion of soft power pressure within the UPR
mechanism has been established, I will provide an in-depth examination of some of the
ways that recommending states have used and failed to use this power over the course of
the UPR’s existence. While the case studies presented within—largely sourced from my
own experiences at UPR 40 and various anecdotes from my interviewees—are not
intended to be a comprehensive account of recommending state participation in the UPR
(which, taking over 578 reviews into account, would be difficult to make sense of in
anything other than broad quantitative terms), it is intended to provide a sense of both the
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highs and the lows of state participation in the mechanism. By contrasting the positive
potential of state engagement with some of the most enduring problems that the
mechanism faces in this category, I argue that the overwhelmingly state-driven nature of
the review stage requires reform.

Breaking New Ground and Sharing Best Practices
Although I adopt a critical stance towards state participation practices throughout
much of this chapter, many of the most constructive moments in the UPR’s history
(which, as a whole, have been notable) can be attributed to the constructive participation
of SuRs and recommending states. These constructive interactions have often revolved
around breaking new ground in human rights discourse and the sharing of best practices
between states. A notable example of breaking new ground occured in the first cycle of
the first review (April 2008), during the interactive dialogue session for Ecuador. During
the review, Slovenia made a recommendation that Ecuador “implement measures to
combat discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation and gender identity, as well as
other human rights violations against the gay, lesbian, bisexual, transsexual and
transvestite community.”132 After the recommendation was given, the Egyptian
delegation called a point of order, objecting that because LGBT rights were not part of
Ecuador’s human rights obligations (the Charter, the UDHR, or any treaties/conventions
that Ecuador was party to) Slovenia did not have the right to include them in a
recommendation.133 However, Ecuador pushed back against Egypt, asserting their right to
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accept any recommendation they wanted,134 and proceeded to formally accept Slovenia’s
recommendation along with the nine other recommendations given during the review.135
Later that year, Ecuador would legalize civil unions for same-sex couples under their new
constitution.
“[T]he farcical situation of Egypt telling Ecuador that it could not accept a
recommendation that it was happy to accept”136 created a unique situation where “no one
knew what to do.”137 Beyond the “tacit agreement that you didn’t talk about LGBT
rights” that had been maintained throughout the existence of the Commission, the
implication that a recommendation like this would be admissible in the context of the
UPR considerably opened up a wider range of thematic issues eligible for discussion
within the context of the mechanism.138 As highlighted by Egypt, Resolution 5/1 states
that, beyond the UN Charter and the UDHR, the basis for review is limited to “human
rights instruments to which a State is party”, “voluntary pledges and commitments made
by states”, and “applicable international humanitarian law.”139 Given that Slovenia’s
recommendation did not follow under any of these categories, Ecuador would have been
well within their rights to note it and move on, but instead they explicitly asserted their
right to accept it. According to some observers,140 this exchange set a valuable precedent
for a wider array of human rights topics open for discussion within the context of the
UPR, emphasizing the mechanism’s potential for “draw[ing] all rights together into one
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conversation”141 and the benefits that a model of this nature has over mechanisms such as
the treaty bodies, which only focus on a specific, pre-established set of issues.
Beyond breaking new ground, another constructive dynamic that has appeared in
the UPR over the years has been sharing of best practices. Sharing best practices was
something that had been explicitly stated as a goal for the UPR from the 2007 Institution
Building Package onward.142 Although most UPR recommendations are not framed along
these lines, constructive moments of this nature have been highlights of the UPR
throughout the years. In practice, the sharing of best practices has often involved
recommending states offering SuRs strategies for promoting human rights through
legislation, and even offering technical assistance for implementing these measures. One
example of this was Switzerland requesting a copy of France’s manual on detecting signs
of torture during France’s first cycle review. Another, as recounted by DominguezRedondo, was Sri Lanka offering the UK technical assistance on the Troubles in Northern
Ireland—a notable reversal of the usual dynamic of “Western countries as saviors for
Global South countries” that usually defines UN interactions of this nature. As stated by
Dominguez-Redondo, at the Commission “it was always the same states talking and
saying the same things”143—with its universal scope and equal-time structure, the UPR
was structured around breaking this loop, and, in some instances, succeeded.
Overall, these constructive moments have led to some refreshing moments of
transcendence from the UN’s underlying regional trends, moving past “sterile and
polarized regional group interactions” in favor of “collective action in favor of the
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promotion of human rights.”144 By viewing the process as “a dialogue and exchange”
rather than “an examination”145 or an empty performative exercise, states are able to use
the UPR as a learning experience through which they can gain valuable knowledge of
“relevant human rights standards and what they mean for their country.”146 As stated by
Sen, the states who feel that they gain the most from the process are those who “treat[...]
the UPR as a chance to listen, learn, and harness support.”147 However, although this type
of constructivist discourse around mutual learning is common among UN officials148 and
academics,149 diplomats involved in the process are well aware of the fact that most states
do not approach the mechanism with this degree of openness.150

“Rigging the Jury”
The public forum of the UPR causes many states to become extremely selfconscious about their image. States will typically act upon this self-consciousness in two
ways. At times, they attempt to convey strong engagement with human rights through
their participation in the mechanism. Although this performative engagement may or may
not hold any real “weight” behind it (i.e. tangible human rights improvements taking
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place within the SuR post-review) it is better than the alternative—states engaging in
strategic political manipulation to weaken the interactive dialogue. As stated by
Chauville, “while most states to this point have played by the rules of the UPR, some
have been inventive in their attempts to prevent the mechanism from working.”151
Political manipulation within the UPR goes back to the first cycle. During the first
session, some states quickly discovered that a technical loophole in the sign-up system
allowed them to “rig the jury” for any given review.152 As outlined by the initial
guidelines for the mechanism, a limited number of recommending state slots were offered
for each state review on a first-come-first-served basis.153 Taking advantage of this, some
SuRs would solicit as many friendly states as they could before their review and ask them
to fill up the signup list before critical states had a chance to do so.154 In turn, the
soliciting state would promise their friendly peers that they would help fill up the sign-up
list before their review,155 creating a vicious cycle of mutual praise that has gone on to
plague the UPR system to this day.
In practice, these under-the-table negotiations between friendly states often
resulted in dozens of diplomatic mission interns sleeping in their cars outside the main
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gate of the Palais des Nations so that they could be the first to sign up the morning before
the interactive dialogue.156 Once the jury was stacked, the SuR could enjoy a stress-free
review consisting primarily of congratulations from friendly states for their human rights
successes, deemed by critics to be an “exercise in filibustering.”157 This led to interactive
dialogue sessions such as the first cycle review of Cuba, during which only eight out of
the fifty-three states that spoke gave recommendations containing any genuine critical
content.158 Furthermore, first cycle jury stacking practices often led to glaring omissions
of active human rights crises from the interactive dialogues of offending states. For
example, although it was discussed extensively in the background documentation
produced by the OHCHR159 and civil society stakeholders,160 the issue of violence
against the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka was completely overlooked by recommending
states during its interactive dialogue session.161
After the first cycle, a series of reforms changed the sign-up system to eliminate
the first-come-first-serve policy going forward. Instead, once the signup list was closed,
the OHCHR would pick a random point in the alphabet to start from, and recommending
states would speak in alphabetical order starting from there. Furthermore, there would be
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no limit to the number of states allowed to speak at any given review.162 In order to
compensate for this, the more states signed up to speak for a review, the smaller the
allotted speaking time for each state became. Although this change was “a step in the
right direction”163 in that it prevented outright jury rigging in the style of Cuba’s first
cycle review, the UPR sign-up system remains prone to political manipulation by SuRs
and their allies. The new system’s main flaw is that the more states sign up, the less time
there is to talk, allowing self-conscious SuRs to “make sure that all [their] friends
register, [which] ends up leaving forty seconds to everyone and the quality of the review
goes down.”164
On the surface, states’ desire to be perceived as respecting human rights in order
to be accepted by their peers165 might appear to be a positive, if gradual, step towards
eventual human rights compliance. However, when states respond to this pressure by
simply soliciting a stack of easy-to-accept recommendations from their friends,166 human
rights violators are encouraged to continue their practices167 and the mechanism is
delegitimized. This solicitation process also involves disturbing political power
dynamics, such as developing countries being passively or actively coerced into being
complimentary toward donor countries, further challenging the “universal” nature of the
review. As stated by an anonymous North African diplomat in Cowan’s Rituals and
Ritualism article, “If you are a developing country receiving aid from a donor country,
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are you going to criticise it? Let’s be frank. You will not do something that will affect
bilateral relations. We have to be realistic.”168
Another key opportunity for states to manipulate the UPR occurs between the
review stage and the final plenary session adoption, when the Report of the Working
Group is being drafted. During this period, SuRs can pressure the drafters to move certain
recommendations that they deem to be “off-topic” from the main body into the footnotes
of the report. A particularly infamous example of this practice occurred during Russia’s
2013 review, during which Russia successfully persuaded the drafters to move two
recommendations from Georgia about the Russian occupation to the footnotes section.169
Overall, while this type of manipulation is not an extremely common UPR practice, it
does speak to the high level of power that SuRs (particularly states with political power
such as the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council) have over
their own fate within the context of the mechanism.
The fact that criticism at the UPR is so often equated with lack of support170 may
be an unavoidable reality of international diplomacy. However in the UPR, states have
created a space where they can comfortably appear to engage with human rights on the
global stage while still maintaining an overwhelming level of control over the process
when it is their time to stand for review.171 While some first cycle commentators initially
suggested that this type of non-confrontational environment would lead to states being
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more self-critical,172 many observers argue that this has not proved to be the case to any
significant degree.173 At a certain point, this safe space of mutual praise becomes not just
a blemish on the surface of the mechanism, but an open wound that erodes healthy
dynamics and encourages toxic ones.

Lack of Interactivity
“...during the interactive dialogue, one is on occasion left with a sense that
states are talking past each other. Sometimes it seems as if there has not
been a true meeting of the minds.”
—Natalie Baird, Rituals and Ritualism174
From the beginning of the UPR process, many observers have been frustrated by
the fact that, within the review portion, there exists a “lack of real opportunities to engage
and contest the language of human rights.”175 Although the interactive dialogue has
provided a platform for positive interactions, there are a number of glaring participatory
and technical issues that prevent this stage of the process from living up to its name. The
disconnect between the (commonly pre-written) SuR presentations and the comments
being given on the floor by other states is often problematic, with disproportionate
attention being placed by the SuR on issues that recommending states display no interest
in.176 Furthermore, since the SuR has a limited amount of time to speak, it may use the

172

Duggan-Larkin, “Can an Intergovernmental Mechanism Increase the Protection of Human Rights?”,
553.
173
Interview #1.
174
Natalie Baird, “The Universal Periodic Review: Building a Bridge Between the Pacific and Geneva?”,
in Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism, edited by Hillary Charlesworth
& Emma Larking, Cambridge University Press (2014), 208.
175
Kälin, “Rituals and ritualism”, 40.
176
This was a particular problem during the 2020 interactive dialogue for the United States’ UPR, during
which the United States delegation made extensive use of pre-recorded statements throughout the review.
These statements were often extremely disconnected from the issues that recommending states were
bringing up in real time, skimming over or altogether ignoring a number of key issues such as racism in the

59

majority of that time on a lengthy opening statement (often primarily consisting of repeat
information from their pre-written State Party Report), eliminating the opportunity for
direct, in-time responses to recommending states’ concerns.177
Another key factor that has had a major impact on interactivity within the UPR
has been the introduction of hybrid modalities during the COVID-19 pandemic. Hybrid
modalities, as acknowledged by the OHCHR itself,178 have been a double-edged sword
for the UPR. The main benefit from the OHCHR’s point of view has been the capacity to
attract higher-level delegations by allowing state officials to participate in the interactive
dialogue via Zoom rather than having to physically travel to Geneva.179 This has helped
produce larger, more diverse delegations that include specialized members from a wide
variety of SuR governmental departments. This diversity can help ensure informed
responses on specific issues that these departments work on (health care, policing, etc).
Hybrid modalities also encourage higher-level government representatives to participate.
This was particularly evident at UPR 40, which included a lengthy pre-recorded
statement from Icelandic Prime Minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir and a virtual intervention by
Venezuelan Vice-President Delcy Rodríguez (who fronted the Venezuelan delegation
throughout the review). Although I would reject some observers’ claims that high-level
delegations automatically signify “the seriousness with which [SuRs] take the UPR
process”, I do agree that increasing the UPR’s profile through methods such as this
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legitimizes the mechanism and increases the potential for governments to “buy in” to the
process as a whole.180
In spite of the advantages that hybrid modalities have provided, they also present
a significant number of new problems surrounding interactivity within the mechanism.
One of these problems was decreased engagement resulting from the ease of access
inherent to virtual participation. While some would say that virtual access is better than
no access, this becomes a particular problem when states that are capable of intervening
in-person choose to do so virtually out of convenience. This was particularly evident at
UPR 40 with one Syrian delegate, who, after appearing in Salle XX physically for her
own country’s review, intervened virtually from her hotel room for other countries’
reviews, only appearing in person again for Syria’s adoption segment at the end of the
week. This points to the risk that normalizing virtual participation post-COVID could
potentially lead to an increase in half-hearted participation and/or the practice of
strategically overfilling the recommending state sign-up list to decrease speaking time
and quality of discourse outlined in the previous section.
In addition to passive engagement, state delegates who choose to engage virtually
when they could do so physically lose many opportunities to engage in active diplomacy
with other states concerning human rights topics. A powerful example of the power of inperson diplomatic engagement during UPR 40 occurred during Moldova’s interactive
dialogue. After receiving critical comments from the Netherlands regarding judicial
transparency and hate speech, a member of the Moldovan diplomatic mission approached
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the Dutch representative. After some friendly conversation, the Dutch delegate handed
the Moldovan delegate some papers, possibly containing additional info regarding the
recommendations that had been given. This interaction represented both a case of a SuR
responding well to constructive criticism and the power of ad-hoc, in-person diplomatic
interactions in facilitating the sharing of best practices between states.
Another major interactivity issue brought about by the introduction of hybrid
modalities has been the prevalence of pre-recorded statements by recommending states.
Although pre-recorded statements are useful for states located in drastically different time
zones to Geneva, they decrease the overall interactivity of the dialogue. Although
recommending states leaving sessions after giving their recommendations (a common
occurrence) or not paying attention to the Zoom call during the virtual dialogue are
problems in and of themselves, it is impossible to promote a “dialogue” with the SuR
when the recommending state is physically and virtually absent from the review
altogether. The combination of pre-recorded virtual statements and states leaving after
speaking often called into question whether or not direct SuR responses to recommending
states later in the review (a welcome but inconsistent occurrence in and of itself) held any
purpose, considering the delegates whose points they were addressing were often absent
for various reasons.181
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All in all, many of the truly “interactive” moments between states at UPR 40
came about not in the form of constructive dialogue, but via points of order and interstate hostilities. Many of the instances in which states directly addressed each other were
fueled by a desire to counter recommending states’ criticisms and portray them as
hypocrites. Some particularly memorable examples of this occurred during Venezuela’s
review. Shortly after the Brazilian delegation criticized their handling of the COVID-19
pandemic, the head of the Venezuelan delegation printed out a graph showing Brazil’s
COVID rates. After Colombia expressed their concerns about the independence of the
Venezuelan judiciary and the issue of Venezuelan refugees spilling over into Colombia,
the Venezuelan delegation responded with completely unrelated statistics regarding
recent violence committed by non-state actors in Colombia. Perhaps the most striking
hostile interaction came during the interactive dialogue of Moldova, when, in reaction to
the Moldovan delegation calling Belarus’ strategic funneling of migrants into Moldova
an “attack”, the Belarussian delegation responded by effectively holding the rest of the
review hostage with the following point of order—
“I ask you to call on the delegation to keep to the standard United Nations
terminology. Otherwise I will, on a number of occasions, have to bring points of
order of this kind. Thank you.”
Overall, although positive interactions between states still occur during the
interactive dialogue, many technical and state participation issues stand in the way of the
level of interstate interactivity that the review portion of the UPR was originally intended
to foster. The fact that hostile exchanges exemplify many of the truly “interactive”
moments of the dialogue speaks to the fact that mutual praise, which is often the other
major component of the review, is not a particularly interactive dynamic. If the
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interactive dialogue is truly meant to foster back-and-forth exchanges between states,
dispensation and acceptance of constructive criticism must play a larger role in state
interactions. Unfortunately, this is a task that few states are willing to truly commit to.
Many would rather focus their energy on carefully fostering positive relationships with
international allies rather than fostering true interactivity by showing willingness to
accept honest criticism of their own practices and taking diplomatic risks with other
states. This type of stagnant, repetitive engagement also points to the issue of ritualism.

Ritualism and Performative Engagement
As stated by Hillary Charlesworth and Emma Larking in Human Rights and the
Universal Periodic Review. Rituals and Ritualism, terms, UPR ritualism is defined by
“participation in the process of reports and meetings, but an indifference to or even
reluctance about increasing the protection of human rights.”182 Some commentators see
assessments of the UPR having “fallen into ritualism” as overly critical and emblematic
of the disconnect between the academic view of the UPR and the reality of proceedings
on the ground in Geneva.183 In spite of this viewpoint, while I agree that dismissal of the
UPR as a ritual that produces no results sells the mechanism’s accomplishments short,
Charlesworth & Larking’s framework is helpful when assessing later cycles of the UPR,
as many of their predictions have partially, if not fully, come true. Furthermore, the lens
of ritualism is a particularly useful tool for critically assessing the OHCHR’s
prioritization of the UPR’s 100% participation rate,184 in that attendance does not
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necessarily equate to engagement. In this sense, I join the growing body of contemporary
commentators who assert that ritualism, as defined by Charlesworth & Larking, remains
one of the greatest threats to the UPR.185
As outlined by various authors in Rituals and Ritualism, common signs of
ritualism include reluctance to make action-oriented recommendations, “states
respond[ing] to recommendations by claiming to recognize rights when this is clearly not
the case”, and a general sense of “disconcerting friendliness” throughout the process.186
Overall, the wide-ranging “sincerity” of state engagement187 begs the question of how
many states are simply “go[ing] along” with the process without genuine interest in
constructive engagement.188 This issue became apparent during many state reviews
throughout the week that I attended UPR 40.
A prime example of ritualism (and the difficulty of pinning it down) occurred at
UPR 40 during the interactive dialogue session for Zimbabwe. In the scope of UPR 40 as
a whole, the Zimbabwean delegation was one of the most prepared and engaged
throughout their interactive dialogue. During their state presentation, the delegation
(helmed by their Minister of Justice) focused exclusively on their own government’s
human rights efforts rather than unrelated political matters. They took a great deal of time
to outline numerous specific programs being undertaken by their NHRI (the Zimbabwe
Human Rights Commission) intended to address various human rights problems. They
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also highlighted the fact that they intended to adopt mid-term reporting in the upcoming
cycle, a significant undertaking indicative of strong engagement with the UPR from the
standpoint of the OHCHR.189
Zimbabwe’s interactions with other states throughout their review made it clear
that they were here to make friends, not enemies. During their opening statement, they
took care to respond specifically to each of the advance questions provided by their peers
before the review, showing a level of preparedness and engagement with the questions
that surpassed any of the other states in the first week of UPR 40. When other states made
critical comments, they took them in stride, responding gently even if they were outright
denying the allegations made by the recommending state. Even when there were clear
opportunities to call out recommending states’ hypocrisy, they held back. When faced
with a recommendation from the United States concerning police brutality, Zimbabwe
declined to make a point of order, despite being presented with a painfully perfect
opportunity to make a fool out of the United States that other countries in the room
(whose human rights reputation in the international community had drastically decreased
within the past few years, in large part due to this topic) would have taken in a heartbeat.
While the overall picture they painted may have been rosy considering the flawed
state of civil and political rights within the country, Zimbabwe’s engagement showed that
they cared deeply about how they looked to the international community. As the review
went on, the primary reason that peer pressure had affected their behavior so much
became apparent—Western sanctions. While Syria and Venezuela also touched on
sanctions during their UPR 40 reviews, these were unapologetic authoritarian states who
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knew that good behavior during a UPR session would do nothing to improve their
international reputation. Thus, they behaved as such, engaging in a confrontational,
unconstructive manner (using the sanctions to portray the West as a scapegoat for all of
their countries’ human rights problems). In contrast to this, when Zimbabwe discussed
their sanctions, they used careful, non-confrontational language, reflecting a sense of
hope that, if their international peers saw them constructively engaging in human rights
discourse, the sanctions might be lifted.
Referring to archival footage of Zimbabwe’s second cycle review after witnessing
their third cycle performance during UPR 40, it became apparent that, although the state
delegation had engaged with the mechanism just as enthusiastically during the second
cycle,190 the human rights situation in-country has not only failed to improve but has
declined significantly between the second cycle and the third cycle.191 Overall, the case
of Zimbabwe speaks to the failure of peer pressure as a sole means of pressuring states
into complying with their human rights obligations. While peer pressure may lead to
human rights compliance in some instances, in many others it may lead to self-conscious
states such as Zimbabwe putting their energy into performative, ritualistic UPR
engagement rather than actual change on the ground.
One of the defining qualities of UPR ritualism that makes it difficult to pinpoint is
its subtlety. As opposed to “outright rejection of human rights standards and
institutions”,192 states participate in performative engagement, “accept[ing] most
recommendations without any apparent ability to, or intention of, implementing them,
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[and] masking their unwillingness by sending a very high level delegation that uses
strong human rights rhetoric.”193 When states participate in this manner, their
engagement becomes ritualistic in an almost religious sense, “confessing their faith” by
accepting recommendations and withholding their reservations about human rights
“precisely as those with religious doubts cannot raise them during a religious
ceremony.”194 Rituals and Ritualism argues that this empty ceremony is not only useless,
but dangerous in its potential to turn the UPR into “a vehicle to cover up human rights
violations and divert from reality by invoking and celebrating the language of human
rights without any intention to respect, protect and fulfill them.”195 Overall, the worstcase scenario that Rituals and Ritualism envisions for the future of the UPR is that “over
time, the willingness of states to serve as peers will decline to a core group of
diehards.”196
Although this final prediction may be a bit more extreme than the reality that the
UPR faces today, it is not wildly off the mark. Although some have applauded the UPR’s
“trojan horse”197 approach to human rights discourse by “[teaching states to] talk the
language even if they’re not necessarily walking the walk”,198 after fifteen years of
review sessions, the fact that many states have learned a great deal about strategic use of
human rights rhetoric with little-to-no on-the-ground progress is extremely concerning.
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With an abundance of weak, repetitive, easily accepted recommendations199 and
articulate, strategic SuR delegations that are becoming increasingly adept at performative
human rights engagement, UPR proceedings have developed a sense of burnout that
stands in sharp contrast to the initial “honeymoon period”200 of optimism surrounding the
mechanism in its early days.201 While some states continue to send high-level
delegations, others have “sent progressively lower status personnel to UPR” after the
concern around “putting their best put forward” in the first cycle diminished.202 Going
into the fourth cycle, rumor has it in Geneva that underneath all of the human rights
niceties, “many countries just want to get rid of [the UPR] at this point.”203

How State Participation Illustrates the Need for Reform

“The fact that the country undergoing review can determine the issues
under discussion, the conduct of operation and even the outcomes of the
whole exercise may be a potential weakness of the system. Under the UPR
process, member states are at the same time both parties and judges.”
—Purna Sen, Towards Best Practice204
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In contrast to early predictions that the UPR might gradually make the process of
giving and receiving constructive human rights criticism “less awkward” over time,205 the
truth has emerged that most states will always be averse to engaging in these types of
critical conversations, especially during interactions with their regional and ideological
allies.206 As illustrated by my findings in this chapter, predictions that a softer, less
confrontational model of dialogue might normalize human rights interactions and open
the door for “norm cascade and norm infiltration”207 are in strong need of reevaluation.
Although the mechanism has occasionally achieved some semblance of this in some of its
best moments, the global human rights cascade envisioned by first-cycle optimists is
nowhere in sight. This could be attributed to “a clear correlation between state adherence
to democratic values [...] and [...] robust utilization of the UPR.”208 With global
democracy on the decline over the past sixteen years209 (coincidentally coinciding with
the original mandate for the UPR in 2006), the cases outlined in this chapter exemplify
the steep struggle of convincing a decreasingly democratic world to constructively
engage in human rights enforcement.
As states have learned “what to expect” out of the UPR process,210 they have
become increasingly adept at using the language of human rights to make it appear as
though they are engaged, even when they are indifferent towards the process or actively
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seeking to sabotage it from within. This creates an increasingly dangerous dynamic of
performative engagement that necessitates structural reform. While the United Nations
aims to move past the Commission’s naming and shaming practices, the current model’s
focus on non-confrontation is sorely in need of a more substantive counterpoint.
Although naming and shaming may be a contentious method of addressing human
rights violations from many states’ perspectives, carefully re-introducing elements of it
has strong potential to make full use of the UPR’s ability to exert soft power pressure on
states (particularly those that are unlikely to respond positively to more cooperative, nonconfrontational efforts) through its use of a “public spotlight”, a feature that was not
present in the Commission.211 Furthermore, the constructive “peer pressure” aspect of the
mechanism could be maintained if non-state actors were the ones directly confronting
states about their human rights abuses. This suggests the prospect of increased civil
society participation in the UPR.
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While some states may never change their human rights practices no matter the amount of public
pressure exerted on them, publicly visible civil society participation will ensure that the review sessions for
these non-compliant states will provide, if nothing else, increased public awareness around the human
rights violations people on the ground are currently facing.
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Chapter 5: Civil Society Participation in the UPR
Introduction to Civil Society Participation: Engaged but Absent
Emerging from the UPR negotiations, the initial role of civil society in the process
was “somewhat unclear.”212 On a formal level, they had been afforded “no active role in
the review itself.”213 However many observers saw their participation as integral to the
credibility of the mechanism.214 Facing this challenge, civil society spent the next fifteen
years creatively carving out a space for themselves within the UPR process, attempting to
gain influence through both formal and informal methods. However, over the years, the
paradox of civil society participation has become more and more evident—although they
are some of the most engaged, informed actors involved in the UPR, they are still
afforded little to no agency. In order to justify my call for a re-evaluation of civil
society’s role in the UPR, I draw on my personal experience attending civil society
events and testimonials from civil society members to provide an in-depth picture of the
formal and informal avenues (Stakeholder Submissions, the plenary session, media
engagement, ad-hoc state lobbying, and the UPR Info Pre-session) that civil society
organizations use to participate in the process. As I assemble this evidence, I use it to
argue that increased civil society participation would not only increase the UPR’s overall
legitimacy, but would also allow it to exert a new level of “public pressure” that it has
been unable to tap into up until this point.
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Avenues for Civil Society Participation: Silence of the NGOs
Stakeholder Submissions
“You send this out into the stratosphere and you have no idea if anyone is
receiving it”
—Civil Society Interviewee215
The other formal opportunity for civil society participation in the UPR process is
through Stakeholder Submissions. Stakeholder Submissions are written submissions
provided either by individual or coalitions of civil society organizations, and, along with
the National Report and the OHCHR Compilation, are one of three primary background
documents that the interactive dialogue is intended to be based around. On a technical
level, Stakeholder Submissions run from about 5-10 pages, with submissions drafted by
coalitions of stakeholders being afforded more space than submissions by individual
organizations.216 However, before each review session, all Stakeholder Submissions are
compiled by the Secretariat into a ≤10-page summary report.217
The process of compiling this report is in and of itself, fraught with political
drama and controversy. Although the Secretariat aspires to rise to their “moral duty” of
representing voices in the field in a transparent and apolitical manner,218 a number of
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Individual Stakeholder Submissions are limited to 2815 words while submissions drafted by coalitions
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complications make this task a difficult one. Firstly, Secretariat drafters often experience
attempts at “intimidation” from SuRs who object to certain critical NGO submissions
being included in the Stakeholder Submissions summary report.219 While these attempts
are often unsuccessful due to the drafters’ pride in their “capacity to resist the pressures
of states”, these pressures can still lead to some questionable practices from the
Secretariat. A primary example of this is how certain controversial issues are sometimes
filed in different sections of the compilation in order to present them in a way that would
be less offensive to certain SuRs (i.e. filing LGBT rights issues under “Right to Privacy”
rather than “Non-Discrimination).220 Although this practice is not universal, it holds
disturbing implications for the credibility of the Secretariat drafters and, in a larger sense,
of the overall credibility of a state-driven model of human rights enforcement.
Secondly, certain SuR governments have an extensive history of strategically
using fake civil society organizations known as “GONGOs” (government-organized nongovernmental organizations). Although there is some dispute as to what type of
organization qualifies as a GONGO,221 they can generally be identified as local
organizations whose work is often unrelated to human rights used by SuRs and their
allies to flood the stakeholder submission pool with hundreds of complimentary
219

Some SuRs will use the UPR submissions as an opportunity to dismiss critical NGO submitters as
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submissions.222 These are highly problematic in that the Secretariat is obligated to include
one citation per submitted NGO report in the final Stakeholder Submissions summary
report,223 which gives SuRs flooding Stakeholder Submissions with complimentary
GONGO reports a similar effect to SuRs “rigging the jury” with complimentary states
during the interactive dialogue—the more complimentary submissions are provided, the
less overall space for meaningful criticism within the ≤10-page summary report.
The last major issue surrounding Stakeholder Submissions is the fact that the
background documentation submission deadlines give SuRs a considerable strategic
advantage over NGOs. While the deadline for individual stakeholder submissions is fiveto-seven months before the interactive dialogue of the target SuR, the deadline for the
state party report is only six weeks before the review.224 This gives SuRs ample time to
review the Stakeholder Submissions report and strategically downplay NGO criticisms
via the State Party report. When asking an experienced civil society representative how
prevalent this was in practice, he reported that any strategically savvy state would make
sure to review the Stakeholder Submissions report before writing their State Party
report.225 Although this practice is not as problematic as GONGO submissions, it is yet
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another example of a strategic advantage that states have in controlling their own framing
within the scope of the process.
From the beginning of the UPR, some actors have lauded Stakeholder
Submissions as “an outstanding feature” of the UPR process that represents a wellinformed, “bottom-up” approach to human rights enforcement.226 However, from an
NGO perspective, writing Stakeholder Submissions is often an unrewarding process.
While some NGOs appreciate the opportunity to “communicate with their governments
in an official capacity”,227 as well as the UPR’s predictable schedule (which makes it
easier to keep up with than the treaty bodies),228 an overall sense of frustration still
pervades.229 Quality submissions, which require extensive effort to produce, are often
distilled down to single sentences in the final summary report due to the overall number
of submissions.230 The weight placed on the State Party Report often leads to the fact that
recommending states might not even read the summary report for guidance,231 much less
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an individual submission (which are only accessible via a footnote on the “UPR
Submissions” page of the OHCHR website).232 Overall, “lack of transparency”,
“water[ing] down” of NGO contributions in the summary report233 and “low-level
bureaucrats at OHCHR [making] up their own rules and [...] bullying NGOs into
following them”234 has eroded the relationship between the Secretariat and many NGOs
over time. This has led NGOs to seek influence outside of the formal avenues presented
to them by the UPR’s official guidelines.

Outside the UN Bubble: Raising Awareness Through Public Engagement and Media
Coverage
From the beginning of the UPR’s existence, many commentators have touted its
public nature as one of its strongest assets.235 However, publicity does not equal public
awareness.236 Although the UPR process is made public through the availability of

Stakeholder Submissions report when the SuR is a small, lesser-known country (Lithuania, Iceland) and/or
if the SuR is engaged in overwhelmingly positive human rights practices to the point where it is difficult to
determine an area in which to provide criticism without consulting the background documentation
(Iceland). Although these reasons only apply in a limited number of cases, they can be considered positive
practices in the context of the current UPR structure in that recommending states’ ignorance is forcing them
to consult civil society.
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In her concern about “the severe lack of reporting of the first session” Dominguez-Redondo suggests
that this may be due to the fact that “it is relatively easy to suppress the process, despite being public, from
national consciousness” (Dominguez-Redondo, “An Assessment of the First Sessions”, 734). In Rituals and
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webcasts and archival footage of interactive dialogue via UN Web TV, the availability of
UPR documentation via the OHCHR website, and so on, these measures do not
automatically mean that the media and the public will engage with these resources. Thus,
the burden of forging a bridge between the UPR and the public falls on civil society
actors,237 who have attempted to raise awareness through a variety of strategies over the
years.238 However, awareness campaigns to engage the public and the media with the
UPR have generally fallen flat, especially in many Western democracies where
mainstream media tends to take a hostile stance towards the notion of Western
democracies being held as “peers” alongside non-democracies.239 As stated by Sarah

highly controlled and ‘public’ information both reveals and conceals.” (Cowan, “The Universal Periodic
Review as a public audit ritual”, 53).
237
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next review of the US’ human rights record will be (most people’s guess—“never”).
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“...the formal equality conferred by the UN on all UN member states [...] is a cherished feature for
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knowledgeable about its human rights situation is farcical.” He also highlights how these problematic states
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human rights enforcement, asserting that international human rights standards are “about principle, not
compromise.” Beyond being useless (at least for a country such as the United States), one of Schaefer’s
main arguments about the UPR is that it is actively detrimental to human rights discourse. He focuses on
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official documentation surrounding the review (Brett D. Schaefer, “Universal Periodic Review Reflects
‘Deficiencies’ of Human Rights Council”, The Heritage Foundation, (2021)).
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Joseph, “even outlets which have a reputation for exceptional human rights reporting,
such as The Guardian and Al Jazeera English, do not report much on the UPR.”240 This
can be attributed to the fact that, in spite of its grand scale, it is difficult to formulate a
news hook around any aspect of the UPR other than hostile interactions between states.
As described in Chapter 4, the types of diplomatic acts of cooperation that show the UPR
at its best lend themselves far better to the format of academic analysis than mainstream
media coverage, and are often indicative of possible legislative changes yet to come
rather than attention-grabbing “breaking news” stories.
As a result of these barriers, there is generally a very low level of awareness
around the UPR process among the general public, and even within the international
affairs community, throughout most countries in the world. While some early
commentators saw increased media coverage as “a spotlight” with the potential to “shame
states into taking measures to improve their implementation of their human rights
obligations” and “remove the UPR from the ritualized confines of a UN building in
Geneva”,241 this optimism has been dampened as it has become increasingly clear over
time that the media has “very limited interest” in the UPR process,242 proving to be “at
best an unreliable ally in promoting human rights”243 with some exceptions.244
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Plenary Session
Despite their “very limited role in the formal process”,245 civil society
representatives are given one speaking role within the UPR. As dictated by the Institution
Building Package, “other relevant stakeholders will have the opportunity to make general
comments before the adoption of the outcome by the plenary.”246 In practice, this has
taken the form of NGO representatives being granted a limited number of two-minute
speaking slots at the plenary session of the Human Rights Council when the final
adoption of a UPR report takes place (also known as “Item 6” on the Council agenda).247
These slots are provided on a first-come-first-serve basis, with the OHCHR attempting to
fit in as many speakers as possible during the twenty minutes allotted to NGOs during
this segment (usually adding up to a maximum of about ten speakers). However, as
outlined by Jessica Duggan-Larkin, NGOs are not always eager to sign up in the first
place—
“Despite being the only opportunity for stakeholders to present, in many
plenary sessions there has been limited or no NGO presentations, perhaps
indicating that NGOs see little value in this aspect of the process.”248
There are a number of problems with the plenary sessions speaking slot that
prevent it from being an effective avenue for civil society influence on the UPR process.
On a technical level, “the high-level delegations seen at the working group are often not
present for the plenary stage”. Some of the state delegates that do show up have a history
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of interfering with civil society participation by questioning the extent of their speaking
rights249 as outlined in the Institution Building Package.250 Furthermore, although the
session is technically public (broadcast live and archived via UN Web TV), Item 6 videos
are extremely difficult for uninitiated observers to locate because they are labeled by their
meeting and session numbers (i.e. “XXth Meeting, XXth Regular Session of the Human
Rights Council), with no mention of “UPR” or “Item 6” in the video titles. This labeling
technique makes it effectively impossible to locate footage for any given SuR’s plenary
session UPR Outcome segment unless the person searching the archive knows the exact
meeting of the session during which the UPR Outcome of their target SuR’s took
place.251 Even if one finds the correct video, the video in question is usually around nine
hours long with no timestamps indicating when any given SuR’s UPR Outcome takes
place, much less individual NGO speaking slots. Although it is difficult to determine
whether this is merely a technical deficiency or an intentional obfuscation, it is
reasonable to assume that if the OHCHR made a significant move to make these sessions
more accessible to the general public (i.e. posting them on YouTube, posting highlights
clips, implementing a working one-click timestamp system) it would be met with strong
resistance from the same countries that originally protested the session being made
available on UN Web TV via livestream and archival footage.
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Beyond this, the biggest problem with plenary session Item 6 as the only NGO
speaking role within the UPR process is the fact that the plenary session speaking slot
occurs too late to make a difference in the process.252 Although these speaking slots
enable NGOs to directly address state delegations, they are relatively unhelpful in that
they fall at the end of the UPR process after all opportunities to influence the outcome
have long since passed.253 Indeed, many plenary session comments by civil society
representatives largely amount to recaps of recommendations that the SuR accepted and
did not accept. Civil society statements often revolve around recommendations for the
SuR to consider implementing by the next cycle, which, four-and-a-half years down the
line, is likely far from most SuR delegates’ minds. Civil society can use the platform of
the plenary session to poke holes in inaccurate information provided by the SuR during
the interactive dialogue, but even this is so far removed from the Dialogue itself that its
impact is significantly lessened. All in all, while the plenary session speaking slot is an
interesting anomaly in the scope of civil society participation, the real focus of civil
society UPR engagement is on paper via stakeholder submissions and behind the scenes
in various lobbying scenarios.

Lobbying States
From the start of the UPR, in order to supplement the suggestions outlined in their
Stakeholder Submissions, civil society organizations have pivoted towards lobbying
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states as another primary avenue in their attempts to influence the process. Although the
OHCHR “strongly encourage[s]” SuRs to consult civil society throughout their UPR
process,254 they provide no official venue for interactions to occur, making these
connections dependent “on the will of the States alone”255 and therefore extremely
uneven. Even when some states such as the United States host civil society UPR forums
as a matter of routine every cycle, some civil society actors in attendance see them as
superficial.256
Throughout the existence of the UPR, many organizations have come to focus
their lobbying efforts primarily on recommending states rather than SuRs in hopes that
these states will serve as a mouthpiece for their issues during the interactive dialogue. In
the interest of this, NGOs typically organize strategically targeted ad-hoc meetings with
individual states257 and parallel events for recommending state delegations to attend in
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order to effectively convey their issues through strategic lobbying.258 While ad-hoc
lobbying efforts speak to the creativity and resourcefulness of civil society, they are
problematic as a primary venue for civil society influence in that not every NGO has the
connections necessary to effectively lobby states. From the first cycle259 to the present,260
NGOs' ability to lobby states effectively has been heavily dependent on their resources
and their connections in Geneva.261 As reported by one NGO advocate, “your sole voice
is difficult to get across. A small NGO is probably not going to be heard unless they have
a strong backing and connections in Geneva.”262 Another interview with a Geneva-based
NGO advocate took this a step further, specifically emphasizing the importance of a
physical presence in Geneva (either via a Geneva office or regular visits to Geneva) in
order to build relationships with state delegates through in-person meetings.263 This poses
a major disadvantage to the vast majority of NGOs throughout the world, who lack
physical and/or political ties to Geneva.
Another major issue currently facing NGO representatives seeking to lobby state
delegates is the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic has significantly altered civil
society lobbying tactics, leading NGOs to lean more on virtual side events and one-onone meetings throughout much of the third cycle. While some NGOs have reported
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frustrations with virtual lobbying,264 some see this as a positive change, reporting
increased state delegation attendance of virtual side events as opposed to physical side
events265 and increased capacity for civil society members who cannot afford to travel to
Geneva to participate in the process.266 Nonetheless, many NGOs without extensive
Geneva connections still feel lost within the process—as stated by one representative
from a small U.S.-based NGO, “every time I attempt to have an insight, the terrain
changes.”267 Overall, while some NGOs have become increasingly savvy at lobbying
over the course of the UPR’s existence,268 the importance of Geneva connections and
limited formal opportunities for engagement have caused many NGOs to feel left out of
the process. Furthermore, with no guarantee that states will take up their issues no matter
how hard they lobby,269 even well-connected, Geneva-based NGOs sometimes display a
sense of burnout over the process.270

The UPR Info Pre-Session
Beyond the ad-hoc lobbying that civil society does in the months leading up to
any given Working Group session, the UPR Pre-session, hosted by UPR Info,271 has
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become a key venue for civil society to connect with state delegations in order to have
their issues picked up. The Pre-session takes place about six weeks before each UPR
Working Group, and consists of an hour-long session for each state during which civil
society representatives outline issues for recommending states to bring up during the
interactive dialogue. Although it is not a formal UN event, the Pre-session gives civil
society a structured, consistent platform to inform state delegates about their issues of
concern and serves as a “more direct and relatable method of communication” between
civil society and states than the Stakeholder Submissions report.272
Similar to the interactive dialogue, one of the most important changes to occur
within the Pre-sessions over the course of the UPR’s existence has been the transition to
virtual modalities during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, while the interactive
dialogue has adopted hybrid modalities (maintaining partial in-person Salle XX
participation throughout the pandemic), the Pre-sessions have transitioned to entirely
virtual modalities. Similar to the interactive dialogue, this has had both positive and
negative impacts on the process. One major positive aspect is that civil society
representatives speaking at the Pre-sessions no longer have to travel in-person to Geneva
for three to four nights in order to participate.273 However, when discussing the impact of
hybrid modalities with a UPR Info representative, the representative reflected on lack of
state engagement with the online Pre-sessions. While the state delegations in attendance
had usually asked the civil society speakers one or two questions per session when the
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Pre-sessions were hosted in-person, the virtual Pre-sessions had been getting nearly “no
engagement” from the state delegations in attendance. While twenty-minutes of each
hour-long Pre-session had been reserved for Q&A before the pandemic, this time slot had
been minimized because the UPR Info hosts knew that no state delegates were likely to
speak up. When UPR Info reached out to state delegates to figure out why they weren’t
speaking, delegates responded that “[the Pre-session is] great, don’t change anything” or
“just have them [NGO representatives] speak slower.”274
At the UPR 40 Pre-session in December 2021, this dynamic and many others
were put on display. Although many state delegates were present on the Zoom call
(usually about 10-15 delegates per Pre-session) all of the delegates present except for one
refused to engage with the NGO representatives throughout the entirety of the Presession. The UPR Info host tried a number of strategies to spark state engagement during
each SuR’s Q&A segment, from asking her own question during the review of Uganda in
an attempt to get the conversation started to offering state delegates the chance to have
their questions read anonymously by submitting them to her via private Zoom DM. The
failure of the latter offer proved that the states’ silence wasn’t about politics—it was
about lack of engagement. Later, when speaking to an anonymous state delegate about
the Pre-sessions, some light was shed on this issue—although they hadn’t taken up the
offer, the delegate had been told by their superiors that, after logging into the call, they
could go get some coffee, take a walk, and generally do whatever they wanted. This adds
another dimension to state disengagement with virtual Pre-sessions—when UPR Info is
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begging state delegates to engage with NGOs, it is entirely possible that many of them
are off doing something else entirely.
“I would like to thank UPR Info for giving us this platform for the
permanent missions to hear our pleas.”
—Anonymous NGO representative at the UPR 40 Pre-session
In spite of this, the UPR 40 Pre-session contained a number of promising
moments of interactivity between states and civil society. Although only one state
delegate asked questions throughout the entire Pre-session, the questions that they
presented were highly constructive and contributed toward important dialogue with the
civil society representatives in attendance. The first question concerned an accepted
recommendation concerning use of force by the state police that the delegate’s country
had given the SuR during its previous UPR, and whether the SuR had made any progress
in implementation of the recommendation. This was an excellent recommendation in that
the NGO’s answers gave the delegate ammunition that they later used to apply pressure
to the SuR during their UPR 40 interactive dialogue session.
The state delegate’s second question, asked at a subsequent Pre-session,
concerned whether or not the SuR in question had signed and ratified the Optional
Protocol to CEDAW (the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women). While this question initially seemed less relevant than the last due to the
fact that every UN member state’s treaty ratification records are publicly available
information on the OHCHR website,275 it led to an extremely informative discussion with
a civil society representative. The representative said that while the SuR had not ratified
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the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, they did not think asking the SuR to ratify it would be
a productive recommendation, since implementation for the SuR’s accepted conventions
such as the core CEDAW treaty was extremely poor. All in all, the NGO representative’s
response, which included illuminating examples of the poor implementation of the core
CEDAW treaty (sexist content in state-issued textbooks) and explanation of the root of
the problem exemplified the purpose of the dialogue between states and civil society that
UPR Info had intended for the Pre-session to facilitate. The civil society representative
had provided everyone in attendance with valuable insight into on-the ground problems
in the SuR not available in the State Party report, the OHCHR Compilation report, or
mainstream media coverage of the SuR. Furthermore, even if the submissions for the
SuR’s Stakeholder Submissions compilation were sparse enough that the NGO in
question could have gotten some of their key points included, their core advice (that
recommending states should move away from suggesting that their SuR ratify new
treaties and focus on criticizing their implementation of already-ratified treaties) was
much more nuanced than the Stakeholder Submissions compilation would have allowed
for in the best of circumstances.
The other notably positive aspect of the UPR 40 Pre-session was the handful of
SuR delegations that attended their own Pre-sessions.276 This created a unique
opportunity for direct engagement between NGOs and their corresponding SuRs,
allowing NGO representatives to make direct appeals to their own governments. Some
SuRs even gave opening statements at their own Pre-sessions. Overall, SuR delegation
attendance significantly changed the dynamic of the Pre-sessions at which it occurred,
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switching the Pre-session from a one-sided dialogue between NGOs and various
unresponsive state delegates to a sort of mini-interactive dialogue in which the NGOs in
attendance occupied the roles that would usually be taken up by recommending states.277

“Using States As a Mouthpiece”: How Civil Society Participation Illustrates the
Need for Reform
“…while [NGOs] have responded to the UPR process with energy and
enthusiasm, this should not divert attention from the numerous difficulties
they face.”
—Roland Chauville, Rituals and Ritualism278
Although not every NGO is well-connected enough to engage states at a
diplomatic level,279 their adeptness at “using states as a mouthpiece”280 through various
lobbying efforts has increased over the course of the UPR’s existence. Furthermore, in
spite of the limited avenues for formal civil society participation, some actors have come
to appreciate the strategic potential of “getting the first word and the last word” via
Stakeholder Submissions and the plenary session speaking slot.281 However, the fact that
civil society actors are afforded little-to-no formal agency within the UPR process has
gradually taken its toll. Even organizations that are based in Geneva and/or maintain
strong connections to state delegations and the OHCHR have developed a sense of
burnout from being forced to engage in a song and dance of constant networking over the
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last fifteen years,282 often having their suggestions “watered down”283 by recommending
states with softer, less specific284 language when they are presented during the interactive
dialogue for political purposes.285
Throughout analysis of civil society participation in the UPR process, it is
essential to keep in mind that everything civil society does to participate in the UPR
comes at a cost. Assembling stakeholder submission reports, building relationships with
state delegations, and learning to navigate the idiosyncrasies of the UN system costs time
and money that could be devoted to direct aid efforts to address human rights issues on
the ground in SuRs. Furthermore, civil society actors engaged with the UPR face
increased exposure and potential reprisals as a result of their contributions in the form of
surveillance, smear campaigns, threats, and harassment.286 Overall, looking at the UPR
process from a civil society perspective makes it clear that their price of admission to
participate in the UPR—time, money, effort, and even personal danger—is not equal to
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what they get out of the process. As this disparity causes the energy and enthusiasm
displayed by civil society in the early days of the UPR to fade into burnout and
discontentment, a re-assessment of civil society’s role and overall agency within the UPR
process becomes increasingly necessary.
When state participation is taken into consideration, increased civil society
participation becomes not just a victory for NGOs and their constituents, but for the
overall UPR mechanism as well. Although civil society actors are not usually given highprofile speaking roles within the UN Human Rights System, a notable recent exception to
this was when Philonise Floyd, (brother of George Floyd, an African-American murdered
by police in the United States) was allowed to speak during the June 2020 Human Rights
Council Urgent Debate on Systemic Racism and Police Brutality. This event (particularly
Floyd’s speaking role within it) induced a level of widespread news coverage by
mainstream Western media unparalleled by any human rights-related news story since the
United States withdrew from the Human Rights Council in 2018. As a result of the media
coverage surrounding it, Floyd’s speech was highly encouraging not only to many civil
society actors on the ground in the United States, but also to ordinary United States
civilians who may not have been previously engaged with UN human rights
proceedings.287
Overall, as outlined in Chapter 4, while supporters of the UPR regularly point to
its ability to generate pressure on states,288 peer pressure often fails to materialize due to
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most states’ unwillingness to give and receive constructive criticism. However, my
findings show that increased opportunities for publicly visible civil society participation
would not only give civil society an improved platform to raise awareness around
important human rights issues, but could allow the UPR to wield “public pressure” to an
extent that has not been present in the mechanism thus far. In order to explore this
potential for public pressure, I have compiled a proposal for a publicly visible civil
society speaking role at the review stage of the UPR.
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Chapter 6: The Future of the UPR
A Crucial Moment
“...the third and fourth cycle will be crucial moments in the life of a
procedure that is still in its infancy.”
—Walter Kälin, Rituals and Ritualism289
At the beginning of the fourth cycle of the UPR, the mechanism stands at a
crossroads. Hybrid modalities have dramatically changed the way in which the
mechanism operates, both inside and outside of Salle XX. When the pandemic subsides,
it will be up to the OHCHR and the Human Rights Council to decide who will be
included in the process and how. Based on my findings, I argue that the most positive
change to combat ritualism and increase the mechanism’s potential for public pressure on
states would be the introduction of formal, publicly visible civil society participation at
the review stage.

Proposal for Increased Civil Society Participation
Throughout my research, a number of interviewees have expressed interest in a
more meaningful role for civil society in the UPR.290 This is also a sentiment that has
been expressed by many civil society commentators throughout the UPR’s existence.291
Furthermore, some commentators have framed ritualistic UPR engagement by states as a
direct result of “the fact that they do not fear questions from NGOs.”292 Based on my
research concerning issues with state participation, this strongly suggests that increased
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civil society participation could be a powerful remedy to many of the most serious
problems facing the UPR.
While the state-on-state nature of the UPR is undoubtedly a useful asset, states’
inability to engage in constructive criticism often leaves important issues out of the
process. Conversely, as civil society engagement in the UPR clearly shows, the vast
majority of civil society actors have no interest in tiptoeing around controversial issues.
This more direct approach would strongly re-legitimize the UPR and the Council as a
whole. Furthermore, while state-on-state peer pressure can sometimes be an effective
avenue for initiating human rights reforms on the ground, the UPR’s potential for
exerting public pressure remains largely untapped due to the minor role that civil society
actors are given in the process. While the media will never follow a mechanism as
bureaucratic as the UPR with the same level of interest of a sports tournament, a highprofile civil society speaking role could drastically increase the amount of attention that
the general public pays to the process, This extra attention would vastly improve the
UPR’s potential for exerting public pressure on self-conscious states in the form of media
coverage, domestic political discourse, and even social movements.
Although there are a number of technical and political barriers to implementing a
plan along these lines (which will be addressed later in this chapter) I have used a mixture
of NGO testimony and my own conclusions from attending various UPR events to
construct a model for formal, publicly visible civil society participation at the review
stage. The core model would function as follows:
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1. Each interactive dialogue session at the Working Group on the UPR will be
accompanied by an hour-long “Civil Society Dialogue” session.
2. The dialogue will consist of a two-minute opening statement by the SuR
delegation, followed by a series of two-minute statements by various NGO
representatives, and closing with another two-minute statement by the SuR.
3. The dialogue will take place in Salle XX, on the same day as the SuR’s interactive
dialogue.
4. The dialogue will function in a similar manner to the UPR Info Pre-session, with
civil society members providing information about the human rights situation in
the SuR from an on-the-ground perspective.
5. However, instead of a private event that only diplomatic missions are allowed to
spectate on, the Civil Society Dialogue will be open to the public, both physically
via the Salle XX Public Gallery and virtually via livestream and archival video
footage.
Beyond these core guidelines, there would be a number of technical details to ensure the
functionally and integrity of the model, listed as follows:
● The sign-up list for NGOs to speak at the Civil Society Dialogue will function on
a first-come, first-served basis, with no preferential treatment given to ECOSOCaccredited NGOs. However, to ensure the integrity of the sign-up system and
prevent “jury rigging” practices, all NGOs applying to speak at the Civil Society
Dialogue must provide evidence of having submitted two Stakeholder Submission
reports on the SuR in question during previous cycles of the UPR. In addition, the
recommendations submitted by the NGO in their most recent full-length
stakeholder submission must include a minimum of three “Category 5”
recommendations.293
● NGOs participating in the Civil Society Dialogue are invited to participate
physically in Salle XX or virtually via live/pre-recorded video intervention, with
no preferential treatment given to Geneva-based NGOs.
● NGOs wishing to remain anonymous for security reasons may submit a transcript
of their statement to be read by an OHCHR “stand-in” representative. The NGO
in question will go through the same OHCHR vetting process as other NGOs, but
will simply be listed as anonymous when the OHCHR stand-in is called to speak
at the Civil Society Dialogue.
● In order to ensure maximum public engagement, the Civil Society Dialogue will
be livestreamed via UN Web TV, the United Nations YouTube channel, and the
United Nations Human Rights Facebook page. Full-length recordings will be
uploaded to each of these platforms as soon as possible following each dialogue.
Recordings will include individually labeled time-stamps marking each NGO
speaking slot in the description of the video.
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A Risk Worth Taking: Civil Society as Informed, Reliable Critics
Throughout my research for this project, it has become abundantly clear that there
is a large amount of resistance against increasing civil society participation in the UPR
from both within and outside of the UN. As illustrated in Chapters 3 & 5, many UN
member states fear increased civil society involvement because civil society members are
immune to diplomatic pressure and often extremely well-informed about the on-theground situation in the SuR. Some within the OHCHR see the current modalities and
practices of the UPR as fine the way they are, adopting a “why fix it if it is not broken”294
attitude towards the mechanism and claiming that “improvement needs to happen on a
national level.”295 Some academics, despite often being sympathetic to the plight of
NGOs,296 feel that NGO involvement is good as-is, supporting the current state-driven
model because “it is easier to catch bees with honey than vinegar”297 while claiming that
a disruption of state ownership over the mechanism would threaten its 100% state
participation rate.298 This participation rate is something many observers view as one of
the UPR’s most important achievements.299
“The UPR is based on and draws its legitimacy from its universal and nonselective character, and thus would quickly degenerate into ritualism
should some states decide to withdraw from the process […]The UPR
would lose much of its soul and its raison d’etre if states were no longer
interested in acting as peers. The success or failure of the UPR thus
depends to a large extent on states showing up and actively participating.”
—Walter Kälin, Rituals and Ritualism300
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While I agree that the UPR’s high participation rate is an important factor in its
longevity, I have found through my analysis of state participation that there are a number
of highly problematic dynamics at play within the mechanism that render much of this
participation to be performative, ritualistic and even actively harmful to human rights
enforcement. After fifteen years, the mechanism had largely failed to “enmesh [...] states
within the spider web dynamic of heightened respect for universal human rights norms”
as early supporters had hoped it would.301 On the other hand, when examining the
internal dynamics of NGO participation (a severely under-represented field of UPR
discourse), I found that, while NGOs are afforded very little agency within the UPR
process, their criticisms are usually more informed and specific than those of
recommending states, whose potential as critics is often limited by diplomatic niceties (a
problem which is further exacerbated when recommending states are faced with
criticizing their and ideological regional allies).
As the UPR approaches its fourth cycle, it has become clear that some states will
never assimilate to UN human rights norms no matter how many times they go through
the process. While these may have once been limited to a select few hostile states within
the UN system (Venezuela, North Korea, Cuba), the steady global decline in democratic
values over the past sixteen years302 suggests that this may become more and more of a
problem as time goes on. For this reason, while I affirm that a “constructive” model of
UN human rights discourse is largely preferable to a “naming and shaming” model, I
assert that the addition of a properly vetted NGO speaking role during the review stage
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would strengthen the mechanism’s ability to generate public pressure on states. However,
in contrast to the toxic interstate dynamics of the Commission on Human Rights, naming
and shaming in the form of publicly visible civil society testimony would provide the
UPR with a renewed level of public pressure while retaining the diplomatic advantages of
a peer review.303 Overall, while I absolutely agree that continued state participation in the
UPR is an highly important component of its longevity, and that increased civil society
participation does put state participation at a certain level of risk, the combination of
weak state participation, strong NGO participation, and the solidification of the
mechanism after fifteen years of existence make it a risk worth taking.304

Limitations and Further Research
As stated by Edward McMahon in “Evolution Not Revolution”, “it is a
challenging task to make sense of what is really happening in a vast and complex
mechanism such as the UPR.”305 With this in mind, there are two main ways to go about
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attempting to make sense of the mechanism—quantitative methods (analyzing
recommendation data through the lens of regional trends, action categories, and so on)
and qualitative methods (interviews, observation of the UPR and UPR-adjacent events). I
originally chose the latter approach because I wanted to humanize the process to outside
observers, and stuck with it as I discovered that my interviewees’ thoughts on the
mechanism were often full of compelling insights absent from academic discourse on the
UPR. However, with a database as vast and detailed as UPR Info, quantitative analysis of
the mechanism is still a rich avenue of study, holding the potential to produce more
sweeping, authoritative conclusions on the mechanism than individual anecdotes are
capable of providing.306
As with most studies on the UPR, my thesis is limited in that it is difficult to
outline a causal relationship between domestic legal progress on human rights within
target countries and the outcome of any given UPR review. This makes any type of
analysis focused on the current state of the UPR’s efficacy or the results that it
produces/fails to produce difficult to formulate. In order to remedy this, qualitative
research on the causal relationship between on-the-ground human rights advancements
and the UPR (possibly by means of interviews with state legislators) would be an
invaluable addition to the discourse surrounding the mechanism.
Another contribution to UPR research that would be extremely welcome would be
a study attempting to measure NGOs’ impact on the UPR process through more empirical
means than I chose to employ. While Edward McMahon’s 2013 study measuring to what
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extent states “pick up” NGO recommendations307 is a helpful resource, an updated study
of this nature with a broader scope and deeper investigation into the level of causation
between NGO lobbying and state recommendations would be invaluable to the discourse
surrounding NGOs’ role in the process.

Conclusion
My study on the UPR has yielded a number of key findings in relation to state
participation and civil society participation. As states have learned “what to expect” out
of the UPR process, they have become increasingly adept at using the language of human
rights to make it appear as though they are engaged while maintaining ultimate control
over their fate in the outcome of their review. Conversely, while civil society actors
possess extremely limited agency within the formal UPR process, their strong
engagement with the mechanism through informed, specific recommendations
demonstrates their potential to exert “public pressure” on states if given the platform to
do so.
While Stakeholder Submissions and state lobbying may have been a good start for
civil society participation in the UPR fifteen years ago, it is time to move forward. Now
that the mechanism is up and running, the OHCHR can afford to take its training wheels
off. As acknowledged earlier in the chapter, I am aware that this is a controversial
assertion, but I would hope that even readers who disagree with my proposal come out of
this thesis with a deeper understanding of the problems that the UPR faces. In particular,
I hope that any UN officials who read this will become aware of problems that may not
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be visible to them from their vantage point. Conversely, I hope that civil society readers
will feel that awareness is being raised to the barriers that they face and be encouraged to
renew their efforts in pushing for more meaningful avenues for participation in the UPR.
While the mechanism does not seem to be poised for any sort of structural reform
between the third and fourth cycles,308 I would hope that discourse surrounding these
issues increases over the course of the fourth cycle to the point that reform measures
addressing them (either a model similar to the one outlined in my proposal or a
completely different model designed to address the same structural problems) are
formally implemented via a Human Rights Council resolution, possibly between the
fourth and fifth cycles.
While much of my thesis is very critical of the UPR,309 I am extremely supportive
of the mechanism overall. I specifically chose the UPR to be the subject of my research
because I genuinely believe that it is a largely well-constructed model of human rights
enforcement with great potential to improve human rights practices around the world. I
sincerely hope that my contributions can have a positive impact on discourse surrounding
the UPR, orienting new people to the mechanism and making those who are already
oriented aware of some of the less visible issues that it faces.
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